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 ABSTRACT 
Mining is a hazardous operation and consists of considerable environmental, health and safety 
risk to miners. Unsafe conditions in mines lead to a number of accidents and cause loss and 
injury to human lives, damage to property, interruption in production etc. But the hazards cannot 
be completely obliterated and thus there is a need to define and reckon with an accident risk level 
possible to be presented in either quantitative or qualitative way. 
Safety is paramount in the mining environment. The mining industry has for many years focused 
on injury prevention at the workplace through procedures and training, and has achieved 
considerable success. However, the statistics on major accident events such as fatalities and 
reportable incidents has not shown the corresponding levels of improvement. In the area of major 
hazards control, the mining industry approach has emphasized mainly on past experiences and 
lessons learnt, while other high hazard industries such as the chemical process industry and oil 
and gas industry have taken system safety techniques to new highs.  
There are various methodologies and techniques related to the study of Risk Assessment, as 
profiled in the literature review in the last section. The next step lies in the application of these 
tools to create a Risk assessment or Disaster Management plan for the utilization in the mining 
scenario. It has been seen that Indian mines have not been applying Risk Assessment to the 
desired degree. For the appropriate method to be designed, it is important to address a few basic 
questions and design a step wise formulation of questions to be answered. 
The objective of hazards and risk analysis is to identify and analyze hazards, the event sequences 
leading to hazards, and the risk of hazardous events. Many techniques, ranging from simple 
qualitative methods to advanced quantitative methods, are available to help identify and analyze 
hazards. The use of multiple hazard analysis techniques is recommended because each has its 
own purpose, strengths, and weaknesses. Some of the more commonly used techniques include 
preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), hazard and 
operability studies (HAZOP), fault-tree analysis (FTA), and event-tree analysis (ETA). 
Environmental risk assessment (ERA) involves the examination of risks resulting from natural 
events (flooding, extreme weather events, etc.), technology, practices, processes, products, 
agents (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) and industrial activities that may pose threats to 
ecosystems, animals and people. Environmental health risk assessment addresses human health 
concerns and ecological risk assessment addresses environmental media and organisms. ERA is 
predominantly a scientific activity and involves a critical review of available data for the purpose 
of identifying and possibly quantifying the risks associated with a potential threat.  
 
 
 
(i) 
 
 Identification of an emerging issue or priority for further action can result in a demand for ERA 
to determine whether an initial indication of a problem is valid or not. ERA provides the basis for 
most legislative and regulatory programs as well as for international agreements to address 
identified threats. If a threat to human health or the environment is identified through ERA, risk 
management is performed to consider the need to impose measures to control or manage the risk.  
 
A Safety Management System (SMS) consists of comprehensive sets of policies, procedures and 
practices designed to ensure that barriers to unwanted incidents are in place, in use and are 
effective. An integrated SMS focuses on both the traditional OHS area and on management of 
engineering safety. The SMS tends to integrate all aspects of safety into the ongoing activities of 
everyone involved in the operations—from the operator to the chief executive officer. The 
responsibility for safety is both individual and collective.  
FaultTree+ analysis program for Microsoft Windows enables us to analyse the availability and 
reliability of both complex and simple systems and is easy and intuitive to use. FaultTree+ 
provides an integrated environment for performing fault tree analysis, event tree analysis and 
Markov analysis. The program is rich in features and can model a wide range of scenarios.  
LOGAN for Windows™ allows the construction and analysis of Fault and Event Trees in the 
Windows™ Graphical User Interface environment.  The option to edit Fault and Event Tree data 
files directly is not available in LOGAN for Windows
™
 but as an alternative the files can be 
created or edited using a text editor such as Notepad. The Fault Tree module of LOGAN can also 
be used to solve problems expressed in success logic such as Reliability Block Diagrams and 
Success Logic Diagrams. 
 
We created two working programs for calculating the event possibility of a mine fire using Fault 
Tree and Event Tree analysis. The first program was created using C++ and FaultTree+ 11.0, 
latter being used to create the fault tree for the respective problem, and C++ to create the 
programming code. The program works on the simple input to a set of questions which are 
treated as basic events, and logic gates to compute the eventuality of a Mine Fire. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mining is a hazardous operation and consists of considerable environmental, health and safety 
risk to miners. Unsafe conditions in mines lead to a number of accidents and cause loss and 
injury to human lives, damage to property, interruption in production etc. But the hazards cannot 
be completely obliterated and thus there is a need to define and reckon with an accident risk level 
possible to be presented in either quantitative or qualitative way. 
Statistic of accident in our mines indicate that though there has been a gradual fall in death rate 
per thousand persons employed in mines, it is a matter of great concern that the trend had 
remained almost steady for the last two decades or so. Cause-wise analysis of these accidents 
also reveals that a few known cause groups have been the major contributors. There is a need to 
do something more than traditional measures to make a break through this trend. 
There are good reasons for the mining industry to be concerned about risk in mines, in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms. Inappropriate shift schedules, excessive working hours, 
increased pollution problems, adverse environment & work conditions and lack of training can 
increase exposure risk to miners and result in employee fatigue and danger to life of the miners. 
The resulting severe economic and social consequences include reduced productivity, higher 
accident and occupational disease rates, absenteeism, resignations and increased workers‘ 
compensation. On the other hand, there are considerable commercial, financial and industrial 
relations benefits to be realized from the development and successful implementation of effective 
risk assessment. The extent to which employees feel overworked has implications in four areas 
of immediate concern to employers: safety in the workplace; job performance; employee 
retention; and health-care costs. These can have a significant impact on a mine‘s performance 
and on the health and safety of the workforce in a benign work environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
Fig 1.1: Pie chart showing division of hazard distribution 
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1.1 Sources of risk 
Open cast mines 
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1.2 Need for Risk Assessment 
Safety is paramount in the mining environment. The mining industry has for many years focused 
on injury prevention at the workplace through procedures and training, and has achieved 
considerable success. However, the statistics on major accident events such as fatalities and 
reportable incidents has not shown the corresponding levels of improvement. In the area of major 
hazards control, the mining industry approach has emphasized mainly on past experiences and 
lessons learnt, while other high hazard industries such as the chemical process industry and oil 
and gas industry have taken system safety techniques to new highs.  
It is pertinent to find answers to the four basic questions as follows:   
(i) Are we doing enough in the area of mine safety?  
(ii) If the answer is yes, why is this not reflected in the statistics?  
(iii) What performance indicators do we have to assure ourselves that what we do is not 
only adequate, but effective at the same time? and  
(iv) Finally, what else can we do to implement the philosophy of continual improvement, 
and learn from the experience of other high hazard industries? 
If the answers to the above questions are still not satisfactory then in the view of the necessity of 
finding the answers to such questions and to go for different types of safety in mines, various 
tools and appropriate steps have to be taken to make mining safe and environment friendly. 
Keeping this in view, making workplace safer and better, the project work was undertaken. The 
objectives are as follows: 
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1.3 Objectives: 
 
Before the formulation of the risk handling techniques it is important to understand the 
conceptual definitions behind risk and its various forms. Various literatures are available for in 
depth study on risk assessment in general and mining industries. After understanding the basic 
definitions, individual components in the methodology of risk assessment are to be collected and 
detailed. These give an insight into formulation of risk assessment modules and methodologies 
for a mine working. Safety records for the mining industry in India have been improving over the 
years. However, over 1000 serious accidents still take place every year with over 200 fatalities. 
The fatality rate in the coal industry has been brought down by about 30% in the last decade. 
Currently, it stands at 0.27 per Mt. of output for CIL mines. Considerable attention is being given 
to improve performance in this regard. Compared to some of the advanced coal producing 
countries the accident rate in India needs to be further brought down as can be seen in the 
following Table 1. In the case of underground coal mines, roof falls continue to be the single 
largest cause of accidents, accounting for around 50% of the fatalities underground. Besides 
greater emphasis on training and involvement of workmen in all safety related issues, the 
industry needs to promote a safety culture leading to inherently safe practices. Risk assessment 
and analysis, leading to ―risk management plans‖ should form an integral part of mining at all 
stages from planning to execution. Risk management is a continuous process involving 
identification of hazards, developing and identifying controls and monitoring the effectiveness of 
mining and safety related procedures. With such systems in place it should be possible to further 
bring down the accident rate, which is still high compared to some of the advanced mining 
countries. Further, to put learning into practice by conducting field work in a nearby mine, by 
way of studying all the possible causes of risk, accident rates, and types of accidents. If the mine 
is already following a risk assessment method then to see if it is effective in application and 
suggest improvements.  
There are various methodologies and techniques related to the study of Risk Assessment, as 
profiled in the literature review in the last section. The next step lies in the application of these 
tools to create a Risk assessment or Disaster Management plan for the utilization in the mining 
scenario. It has been seen that Indian mines have not been applying Risk Assessment to the 
desired degree. For the appropriate method to be designed, it is important to address a few basic 
questions and design a step wise formulation of questions to be answered. 
1. What is the scope of Risk Assessment being undertaken?  
2. Which type of disaster/ fatality being covered? 
3. To what depth do we want to enter the Assessment? 
4. Definition of geographical locations. 
5. Objective purpose of risk assessment. 
6. Estimated nature of risk assessment. 
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7. Availability and adequacy of risk assessment data. 
8. Expertise and resources needed and available. 
9. History of incidents at the installation and other related installations. 
10. Unavoidable constraints in the process. 
11. Socio political context in which assessment is to be carried out. 
12. Assumptions on which method is based. 
 
Table 1.1: Fatality Rate per million tons of coal production in select countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
CHAPTER 2 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this section the literature relegating to the understanding and definition of various types of 
risk, risk assessment methodologies and measures undertaken to assess them and certain 
examples has been collected and studied. 
It involves: Risk Nomenclature, Basic Definition of risk, exposure level, quantitative and 
qualitative risk assessment, hazard etc.  
PHA: Potential Hazard Analysis  
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis  
HAZOP: Hazard and Operability study  
FTA: Fault Tree Analysis  
ETA: Event Tree Analysis  
PHEA: Potential or Predictive Human Error Analysis  
O & SA: Operating and Support Analysis  
AEA: Action-Error Analysis 
IA: Interface Analysis  
STEP: Sequentially Timed Events Plot  
Environmental Risk Assessment: Involves study of environmental factors and hazards due to 
mining, such as Acid mine drainage, Mine fires, Slope Instability etc. Risk Management: 
Incorporates study of risk evaluation, emission and exposure control, and risk monitoring.  
The literature has been collected from various mining publications and journals and has been 
referenced at the end of the report. 
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2.2 RISK NOMENCLATURE 
Risk 
(i)As per Oxford dictionary:  Risk is ―the chance of or probable danger, and loss, injury or other 
adverse consequences to human life‖. 
(ii) Risk is defined as ―the probability of injury, disease, or death under specific circumstances.‖  
(iii) The chances of something happening that will have an impact on objectives. It is measured 
in consequence and likelihood. 
Therefore  
Risk = Consequence * Probability * Exposure 
Where,  
Consequence = degree of harm that could be caused to people exposed to the hazard 
Exposure = How often and how long people are exposed to the hazard 
Probability = Chance that a person will be harmed when they are exposed to the risk 
Environmental Risk 
Environmental risk is the risk associated with the likelihood or probability that a given chemical 
exposure or series of exposures may damage human health. Environmental risk takes two factors 
into account: the amount of a chemical present and its relation to the amount the exposed person 
can tolerate.  
Environmental Risk Assessment 
Environmental risk assessment (ERA) involves the examination of risks resulting from natural 
events (flooding, extreme weather events, etc.), technology, practices, processes, products, 
agents (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) and industrial activities that may pose threats to 
ecosystems, animals and people. Environmental health risk assessment addresses human health 
concerns and ecological risk assessment addresses environmental media and organisms. ERA is 
predominantly a scientific activity and involves a critical review of available data for the purpose 
of identifying and possibly quantifying the risks associated with a potential threat. 
Acceptable risk 
This is a risk management term. The acceptability of the risk depends on scientific data, social, 
economic, and political factors, and the perceived benefits arising from exposure to an agent. 
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Adverse effect 
 
Change in the morphology, physiology, growth, development, reproduction, or life span of an 
organism, system, or (sub) population that results in an impairment of functional capacity, an 
impairment of the capacity to compensate for additional stress, or an increase in susceptibility to 
other influences. 
 
Analysis  
 
Detailed examination of anything complex, made in order to understand its nature or to 
determine its essential features. 
 
Assessment  
 
Evaluation or appraisal of an analysis of facts and the inference of possible consequences 
concerning a particular object or process. 
 
Assessment end-point 
 
Quantitative/qualitative expression of a specific factor with which a risk may be associated as 
determined through an appropriate risk assessment. 
 
Assessment factor 
 
Numerical adjustment used to extrapolate from experimentally determined (dose–response) 
relationships to estimate the agent exposure below which an adverse effect is not likely to occur. 
 
Effect assessment 
 
Combination of analysis and inference of possible consequences of the exposure to a particular 
agent based on knowledge of the dose–effect relationship associated with that agent in a specific 
target organism, system, or (sub)population. 
 
Exposure Concentration or amount of a particular agent that reaches a target organism, system, 
or (sub) population in a specific frequency for a defined duration. 
 
 
Exposure assessment 
 
Evaluation of the exposure of an organism, system, or (sub) population to an agent (and its 
derivatives). Exposure assessment is the third step in the process of risk assessment. 
 
Exposure scenario  
 
A set of conditions or assumptions about sources, exposure pathways, amounts or concentrations 
of agent(s)involved, and exposed organism, system, or (sub)population (i.e., numbers, 
characteristics, habits) used to aid in the evaluation and quantification of exposure(s) in a given 
situation. 
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Hazard 
 
Inherent property of an agent or situation having the potential to cause adverse effects when an 
organism, system, or (sub)population is exposed to that agent. 
 
Hazard assessment  
 
A process designed to determine the possible adverse effects of an agent or situation to which an 
organism, system, or (sub)population could be exposed. The process includes hazard 
identification and hazard characterization. The process focuses on the hazard, in contrast to risk 
assessment, where exposure assessment is a distinct additional step. 
 
Hazard characterization  
 
The qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative description of the inherent property of an 
agent or situation having the potential to cause adverse effects. 
This should, where possible, include a dose–response assessment and its attendant uncertainties. 
Hazard characterization is the second stage in the process of hazard assessment and the second of 
four steps in risk assessment. 
 
Hazard identification 
 
The identification of the type and nature of adverse effects that an agent has an inherent capacity 
to cause in an organism, system, or (sub) population. Hazard identification is the first stage in 
hazard assessment and the first of four steps in risk assessment. 
 
Margin of exposure 
 
Ratio of the no-observed-adverse-effect level (NOAEL) for the critical effect to the theoretical, 
predicted, or estimated exposure dose or concentration. 
 
Margin of safety  
 
For some experts, margin of safety has the same meaning as margin of exposure, while for 
others; margin of safety means the margin between the reference dose and the actual exposure. 
 
Measurement end-point 
 
Measurable (ecological) characteristic that is related to the valued characteristic chosen as an 
assessment point. 
 
Risk analysis  
 
A process for controlling situations where an organism, system or population could be exposed 
to a hazard. The risk analysis process consists of three components: risk assessment, risk 
management, and risk communication. 
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Risk assessment  
 
A process intended to calculate or estimate the risk to a given target organism, system, or 
(sub)population, including the identification of attendant uncertainties, following exposure to a 
particular agent, taking into account the inherent characteristics of the agent of concern as well as 
the characteristics of the specific target system. The risk assessment process includes four steps: 
hazard identification, hazard Characterization, exposure assessment, and risk characterization. It 
is the first component in a risk analysis process. 
 
Risk characterization 
 
The qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative determination, including attendant 
uncertainties, of the probability of occurrence of known and potential adverse effects of an agent 
in a given organism, system, or (sub) population, under defined exposure conditions. Risk 
characterization is the fourth step in the risk assessment process. 
 
Risk communication 
 
Interactive exchange of information about (health or environmental) risks among risk assessors, 
managers, news media, interested groups, and the general public. 
 
Risk estimation  
 
Quantification of the probability, including attendant uncertainties, that specific adverse effect 
will occur in an organism, system, or (sub) population due to actual or predicted exposure. 
Risk evaluation 
 
Establishment of a qualitative or quantitative relationship between risks and benefits of exposure 
to an agent, involving the complex process of determining the significance of the identified 
hazards and estimated risks to the system concerned or affected by the exposure, as well as the 
significance of the benefits brought about by the agent. Risk evaluation is an element of risk 
management. Risk evaluation is synonymous with risk–benefit evaluation. 
 
Risk management  
 
Decision-making process involving considerations of political, social, economic, and technical 
factors with relevant risk assessment information relating to a hazard so as to develop, analyse, 
and compare regulatory and non-regulatory options and to select and implement appropriate 
regulatory response to that hazard. Risk management comprises three elements: risk evaluation; 
emission and exposure control; and risk monitoring. 
 
Risk monitoring  
 
Process of following up the decisions and actions within risk management in order to ascertain 
that risk containment or reduction with respect to a particular hazard is assured. Risk monitoring 
is an element of risk management. 
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Safety  
 
Practical certainty that adverse effects will not result from exposure to an agent under defined 
circumstances. It is the reciprocal of risk. 
 
Safety factor 
 
Composite (reductive) factor by which an observed or estimated no-observed adverse-effect 
level (NOAEL) is divided to arrive at a criterion or standard that is considered safe or without 
appreciable risk. 
 
Uncertainty  
 
Imperfect knowledge concerning the present or future state of an organism, system, or (sub) 
population under consideration. 
 
Uncertainty factor 
 
Reductive factor by which an observed or estimated no-observed-adverse effect level (NOAEL) 
is divided to arrive at a criterion or standard that is considered safe or without appreciable risk. 
 
2.3 QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS 
The assessment of risk can be qualitative or quantitative. The latter requires significant specialist 
effort, and therefore, the qualitative assessment is often used as being the simpler of the two. 
However, the Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) provides significant benefits as it not only helps to 
identify and rank the risk contributors, but also assists in setting priorities for directing the risk 
reduction efforts to achieve optimal outcome.  
The QRA integrates all the individual technical studies of the Safety Assessment and evaluates the 
risk from operations to personnel. The risk levels calculated are then evaluated against performance 
standards to ensure ALARP levels are reached.  
The main limitation of QRA is the lack of adequate frequency data for initiating event for the MAE 
(e.g. fire or drilling into misfired hole), and dependency on human error failure probability, which 
is not available for the mining industry.  
Risk Evaluation 
There are no formally established regulatory criteria for risk to personnel in the mining industry. 
Individual organisations have developed criteria for employee risk, the concepts originally 
arising from the chemical process industries and oil and gas industries.  
Because of the uncertainties associated with probabilistic risk analysis, used for quantification of 
risk levels, the general guiding principle is that the risk be reduced to a level considered As Low 
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As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). It is not easy to define what ALARP is, where we stop the 
risk reduction process. 
Figure illustrates the risk criteria. It has three tiers:  
a. A ―Tolerable‖ region where the risk has been shown to be negligible, and comparable with 
everyday risks such as travel to work.  
b. A middle tier, where it is shown the risk has been reduced to As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable level and that further risk reduction is either impracticable or the cost is grossly 
disproportionate to the improvement gained. This is referred as the ―ALARP‖ region.  
c. An ―Intolerable‖ region where the risk cannot be justified on any grounds. The ―ALARP‖ 
region is kept sufficiently broad to allow for flexibility in decision making 
 
Fig 2.1 ALARP 
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and allow for positive management initiatives, which may not be quantifiable in terms of risk 
reduction.  
Some organisations in the process industries and oil and gas industries have set numerical criteria 
for risk as demarcation between the tiers. It is not appropriate to apply the criteria from one 
industry to another, as the nature of the operations and types of risks are entirely different.  
For a well managed mine site, the risk values for underground mining are expected to fall within 
the ALARP range. Therefore a demonstration of adequacy of control measures as part of overall 
ALARP demonstration is crucial. 
2.4 QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Qualitative Risk Analysis consists of performing a qualitative analysis of the risks identified 
during risk identification to prioritize their effects on project objectives. The risks are analyzed in 
terms of existing controls, likelihood of occurrence, severity of impact, precision with which the 
risk is understood, intervention difficulty, and risk level. 
Qualitative techniques are applicable when it is not feasible to quantify risk. Common qualitative 
techniques include the risk assessment matrix, hazardous event severity matrix, and the risk 
graph. These techniques vary in terms of the type and detail of available information. The risk 
assessment matrix is the simplest. Risk is determined by using severity and frequency. The 
hazardous event severity matrix is similar to the risk matrix, but it also takes independent layers 
of protection into account. The risk graph uses severity and frequency, but it takes two additional 
parameters into account. The risk matrix is quite similar to the hazardous event severity matrix. 
This qualitative method enables the determination of a risk index. The safety integrity level (SIL) 
can be determined by using the risk index. For each hazard, this basic process is used: 
• Determine severity category 
• Determine frequency category 
• Determine the risk level 
• Relate the risk to the SIL 
1) Severity Categories:  Severity categories are defined to provide a qualitative measure of 
the worst credible accident resulting from human error, environmental conditions, design 
inadequacies, procedural deficiencies, and system, subsystem, or component failure.  
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Table 2.1: Broadly defined severity category examples 
catastrophic Death, system loss, severe damage to mine or environment  
critical Severe injury, severe occupational illness, major system damage, major mine or 
environmental damage 
marginal Moderate injury, moderate occupational illness, minor system damage, minor 
mine or environmental damage 
negligible Minor injury, minor occupational illness, less than minor system damage, less than 
minor mine or environmental damage 
 
The severity categories are broad, encompassing severity with respect to personnel safety and 
health as well as equipment, mine, and environmental damage. The main focus of this document 
is on personnel safety; therefore, the severity category examples in the next table are more 
definitive for mining. 
Table 2.2:Severity category examples specific to mine safety 
catastrophic Death or multiple deaths 
Critical Severe injury, permanent disability(partial or total) 
Marginal Moderate injury, medical treatment, loss of work days 
Negligible Minor injury, first-aid treatment, no lost work days 
 
2) Frequency Categories: A quantitative frequency is generally not possible early in the design 
process or might not be known at all. A qualitative frequency may be derived from experience 
and evaluation of historical safety data from similar systems. Supporting rationale for assigning a 
mishap probability should be documented in hazard analysis reports.  
Table 2.3: Frequency category examples 
Category Specific individual item frequency 
Frequent Likely to occur frequently Once per year 
Probable Occurs several times in the life of an item  Once in 5 years 
Occasional Likely to occur sometimes in the life of an item Once in 10 
years 
Remote Unlikely, but  possible to occur in the life of an item Once in 20 
 
15 
years 
improbable So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be 
experienced 
Once in 50 
years 
 
3) Risk Assessment Matrix: This matrix maps the risk index to an SIL. Each cell of the matrix 
has a risk index and associated SIL. 
Table 2.4: Risk assessment matrix 
 Catastrophic critical Marginal negligible 
frequent A(SIL 3) A(SIL 3) A(SIL 3) B(SIL2) 
probable A(SIL 3) A(SIL 3) B(SIL2) C(SIL1)  
occasional A(SIL 3) B(SIL2) B(SIL2) C(SIL1) 
remote B(SIL2) C(SIL1) C(SIL1) D(NO SIL) 
improbable B(SIL2) C(SIL1) C(SIL1) D(NO SIL) 
Risk index                                  suggested criteria 
A                                                 Unacceptable risk 
B                                                 Undesirable risk 
C                                                 Acceptable risk with management review and                 
                                                    Approval 
D                                                 Acceptable risk without management review and                 
                                                    Approval 
Risk Assessment and Safety Integrity Level Determination: 
Once a hazard or hazardous event is identified and analyzed, the next step is to determine the 
associated risk. The level of risk is used to determine which hazards have an unacceptable risk 
and which have acceptable risks. Once the risks are identified, the safety performance or degree 
of safety to mitigate risk is determined. The safety performance is quantified by assignment of a 
level 1, 2, or 3, where 3 is the highest degree of safety performance. These levels are called 
safety integrity levels (SILs). It is important to understand that the SIL specifies the safety 
performance of a safety-related system function to reduce a given risk to an acceptable level. 
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Risk assessment systematically enables the ―ranking‖ of risks such that efforts can be focused to 
eliminate risks or reduce the risks to an acceptable level. Some risks might be classified as 
acceptable because they are insignificant or deemed to be at a level that is reasonably practical to 
assume. For example, not every single risk associated with driving a car is eliminated, yet most 
of us are willing to accept these risks or we wouldn‘t be driving cars. Typically, risk is defined as 
the product of severity and frequency. These methods have advantages and disadvantages. 
Qualitative risk assessment techniques are relatively simple to understand. They are subjective 
and the results may vary depending on the person or team of people conducting the risk 
assessment. 
These variations result because of variations in experience, knowledge, expertise, and individual 
perceptions of risk. Quantitative risk assessment is a rigorous technique based on statistical data. 
It requires highly trained and experienced people as well as large quantities of statistical data. 
One negative is that the data may not be available. Secondly, the data that are available might not 
be an accurate representation for a mining application because it might not have been obtained 
for similar conditions of dust, moisture, or vibration. Some of the common qualitative and 
quantitative techniques are described next. It is the user‘s responsibility to select the risk 
assessment technique that is suitable for the application and user‘s expertise. 
2.5 HAZARDS AND RISK ANALYSIS: 
The objective of hazards and risk analysis is to identify and analyze hazards, the event sequences 
leading to hazards, and the risk of hazardous events. Many techniques, ranging from simple 
qualitative methods to advanced quantitative methods, are available to help identify and analyze 
hazards. The use of multiple hazard analysis techniques is recommended because each has its own 
purpose, strengths, and weaknesses. Some of the more commonly used techniques include 
preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), hazard and 
operability studies (HAZOP), fault-tree analysis (FTA), and event-tree analysis (ETA). 
2.5.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA): 
An analysis technique used in the early conceptual stages of design and development. The PHA is 
frequently used early in the conceptual stages prior to design completion. Typically, a team is used to 
identify potential hazards of the main system and possibly some of the major subsystems. It is used 
when there is limited information. Therefore, it is a high-level analysis and is not considered final. 
The PHA output can include ranking of hazards, operational constraints, recommended actions to 
eliminate or control the hazards, and perhaps additional safety requirements. A PHA can utilize 
information including the results of the preliminary hazard list, lessons learned, system and 
component design data, safety design data, and malfunction data to identify potential hazard areas. 
PHA does not designate a specific technique; however, checklists and forms are commonly used. 
Requires knowledge, experience, and understanding of the application. 
 
 
17 
Advantages: 
• Useful at conceptual stages 
• Relatively quick to implement 
Disadvantage: 
• Cannot be used to extensively identify and analyze hazards  
2.5.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): 
This analysis identifies failures of components, subsystems, and their effects on the system. In 
essence, it is a ―bottom-up‖ approach starting with the system‘s components. This is a systematic 
technique to identify and analyze safety-critical components and subsystems of a system. FMEA 
is most effectively conducted during the design phase, thus enabling system design modifications 
to eliminate critical components or subsystems.  
This is an analytical technique, which explores the effects of failures or malfunctions of 
individual components in a system - i.e. "If this part fails, in this manner, what will be the 
result?" First the system under consideration must be defined, so that system boundaries are 
established. Thereafter the essential questions are:  
 1. How can each component/part fail?  
 2. What might cause these modes of failure?  
 3. What could the effects be if the failures did occur?  
 4. How serious are these failure modes?  
 5. How is each failure mode detected?  
The level of risk is determined by: 
 Risk = probability of failure x severity category  
Where severity may be categorised thus:  
         Table 2.5: Severity Category 
Category  Degree  Description  
I  Minor  Functional failure of part of machine or process - no potential 
for injury  
II  Critical  Failure will probably occur without major damage to system 
or serious injury  
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III  Major  Major damage to system and/or potential serious injury to 
personnel  
IV  Catastrophic  Failure causes complete system loss and/or potential for fatal 
injury  
 
And probability may be categorised thus:  
A risk assessment matrix may then be prepared   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Fig 2.2: Severity Category 
 
Level  Probability  Description  Individual failure mode  
A  10-1  Frequent  Likely to occur frequently  
B  10-2  Probable  Likely to occur several times in the life of an item  
C  10-3  Occasional  Likely to occur sometime in the life of an item  
D  10-4  Remote  Unlikely to occur but possible  
E  10-5  Improbable  So unlikely that occurrence may not be experienced  
Table 2.6: Probability – Failure mode 
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Practical application of the FMEA technique would involve the completion of a worksheet in 
which the failure evaluated and risk priority codes identified. A summary sheet can then be 
prepared in which failure modes are listed in declining order of risk priority codes. The summary 
should also list the corrective measures required to reduce the frequency of failure or to mitigate 
the consequences. Corrective actions could include changes in design, procedures or 
organisational arrangements e.g. the addition of redundant features and detection methods or a 
change in maintenance policy may be suggested.  FMEA can be used for single point failure 
modes but can be extended to cover concurrent failure modes. It can be a costly and time 
consuming process but once completed and documented it is valuable for future reviews and as a 
basis for other risk assessment techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis. 
Generally, the tabular format or spreadsheet is used. Some typical failure modes of mechanical and 
electronic components are as follows: 
• Failure to open or close 
• Failure to start or stop 
• Short- or open-circuit failure 
• Increased or decreased resistance, inductance, capacitance 
• Stuck 
• Leaking 
• Clogged 
• Corroded 
The following are the basic steps to conduct an FMEA: 
(1) Identify the system‘s components and subsystems 
(2) Determine all failure modes for each component and subsystem 
(3) Identify the consequences of each failure 
(4) Identify elimination or mitigation of failure 
Advantages: 
• Analysis procedure is simple to understand 
• The FMEA tabular results are relatively easy to understand 
• Good for situations where a component failure has a major system level safety consequence 
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Disadvantages: 
• Does not identify common-cause failures 
• Does not identify multiple failure combinations 
• Human errors during operation and maintenance might be missed 
• Can be time-consuming for large, complex system 
2.5.3 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP): 
A systematic and structured qualitative method of study conducted by a multidisciplinary team. 
Guide words are applied to various parameters to stimulate thinking concerning possible deviations. 
As a result of these deviations, potential hazards and causes are identified. HAZOP had its 
beginnings in the chemical process industry where guide words were designated for process industry 
parameters such as flow and pressure. HAZOP can be applied to a system, subsystem, process, or 
procedure and also to hardware and software. HAZOP can be easier to implement at the later stages 
when designs are firm rather than at conceptual phases. Thus, it is also well suited for hazard 
identification and analysis of modifications during the management of change process.HAZOP has 
been extended for the hardware and software of programmable systems. Hardware and software 
include: 
Hardware: 
• Analog hardware 
• Digital hardware 
• Communications 
• Electro hydraulic subsystems 
• Electromechanical subsystems 
• Miscellaneous hardware (e.g., wires, connectors) 
Software: 
• Software data flow diagrams 
• Software state transition diagrams 
• Entity relationship diagrams 
Guide words are extended with: early, late, before, after. Guide words can be customized for the 
user‘s application and system. The guide words are applied to system and subsystem attributes to 
identify deviations from the design intent that might create a hazard. 
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The HAZOP should be applied throughout the safety life cycle. Early in the life cycle, HAZOP 
should be applied to block diagrams; as the design progresses, HAZOP should be applied to other 
system representations, such as electrical schematic diagrams. Many different types of design 
representations exist. HAZOP can be applied to the following design representations: 
• Block diagrams (electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, etc.) 
• Schematic diagrams (electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, etc.) 
• State transition diagrams 
• Data flow diagrams 
• Object-oriented diagrams 
• Timing diagrams 
• Operating instructions 
• Operating tasks 
• Maintenance tasks 
Table 2.7: Guide Words 
Guide word Standard interpretation PES interpretation 
No  No part of the intention is achieved 
 
No data or control signal passed. 
 
More  A quantitative increase  
 
More data is passed than intended 
Less  A quantitative decrease  
 
 Less data is passed than intended 
As well as  All design intent achieved, but with 
additional results  
 
Not used here because this is already 
covered by ―more‖. 
Part of  Only some of the intention is achieved  
 
The data or control signals are 
incomplete. 
Reverse  Covers reverse flow in pipes and The logical opposite of intention. 
 
22 
reverse chemical reaction. 
 
 
Other than A result other than the original 
intention is achieved  
 
The data or control signals are 
complete, but incorrect. 
 
Early   Not used The signal arrives too early with 
reference to clock time. 
Late  Not used  
 
The signal arrives too late with 
reference to clock time. 
 
Before  Not used The signal arrives earlier than 
intended within a sequence. 
After   Not used The signal arrives later than intended 
within a sequence. 
 
HAZOP guide word interpretation: 
HAZOP is a team-based, qualitative technique that uses guide words applied to parameters in order 
to discover deviations from the intended design. The team should be a multidisciplinary collection of 
people from technical, organizational, and operational groups. The people are typically highly 
qualified by extensive knowledge and experience. Typically, five or six persons are on the team. A 
team might be composed of the following: 
• Team leader • Senior designer • Safety person • Operation and maintenance person • End user • 
Project manager 
The length of time to conduct a HAZOP study depends on the size and complexity of the system. For 
a small system, it may take a day of preparation and a few days to conduct the team sessions. A large 
and complex system may take several days of preparation and a few weeks to conduct the sessions. It 
is important for the team leader to keep the team focused on the important safety topics and sections 
and to help ensure that common sense and logic prevails. It is very important that a common pitfall 
to HAZOP be recognized and dealt with. Often, the study can become quite lengthy, causing the 
members to lose interest and commitment. This can result if the team tries to go into too much detail 
or tries to be too comprehensive. HAZOP should also be applied at the subsystem levels. This 
includes the electromechanical subsystem, electrical communication subsystem, electronic hardware, 
and the software.  
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Advantages: 
• Very good track record of prior use and success 
• Can produce detailed and comprehensive results 
• Does not require extensive training or specialized tools 
Disadvantages: 
• Can be time-consuming for large and complex systems 
• Best for short time periods of use because team members can lose effectiveness 
Table 2.8: Example HAZOP in electrical wiring 
Guide word Example interpretation in electrical wiring 
No  
 
Broken or missing wire or connection. 
 
More  Excessive voltage or current. 
 
Less Under voltage or current condition. 
 
As well as Noise, interference, or EMI in addition to desired signals 
Part of NA 
 
Reverse Circuit polarity is connected backwards or the opposite of the 
intention. 
Other than Wrong wire or signal. 
 
Early NA 
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2.5.4 Fault-tree Analysis (FTA): 
FTA is a logical method of deduction utilizing a graphical depiction of events, faults, or logical 
combinations (Boolean expressions such as AND, OR, etc.) thereof. It begins at the top of the fault tree 
with an undesirable event. Next, the possible events and logical combinations are developed for the 
fault tree until the root causes are determined. The root causes can be triggering events or basic faults. 
It is best to use fault trees on the major events because the trees can grow quite large. FTA can be 
applied to hardware and to operational modes of the system (i.e., startup, operation, maintenance, and 
shutdown). 
Fault trees are suited to analysis of static situations; thus, dynamic situations involving timing are 
difficult to implement. Also, fault 
trees can be qualitative or 
quantitative. A quantitative fault 
tree uses probabilities for the events 
and faults. Finally, the traditional 
fault tree for the system hardware 
has been extended to software fault-
tree analysis. This is best suited for 
analysis of the most critical 
software at the module level of 
detail. There is a standard set of 
graphical symbols to construct the 
tree. Additional symbols are used 
for special situations. For example, 
―transfer in‖ and ―transfer out‖ 
symbols are used to enable 
transition between multiple pages of 
fault trees. The basic symbols used 
to construct fault trees are shown in 
the following table.    Table 2.9: Symbols for fault tree 
 
 
Late  NA 
Before NA 
 
After  NA 
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Advantages: 
• Identifies multiple failures 
• Identifies multiple events and sequences leading to a hazard 
• Identifies common causes 
• Provides valuable documentation to aid investigations of mishaps 
• Suitable for hardware or software 
Disadvantages: 
• Can become time-consuming if trees grow very large 
• Not suited for timing (dynamic) situations 
This is a graphical technique that provides a systematic description of the combinations of possible 
occurrences in a system, which can result in an undesirable outcome. This method can combine 
hardware failures and human failures. The most serious outcome such as explosion, toxic release, etc. 
is selected as the Top Event. A fault tree is then constructed by relating the sequences of events, which 
individually or in combination, could lead to the Top Event. This may be illustrated by considering the 
probability of a crash at a road junction and constructing a tree with AND and OR logic gates. The tree 
is constructed by deducing in turn the preconditions for the top event and then successively for the next 
levels of events, until the basic causes are identified.  
By ascribing probabilities to 
each event, the probability 
of a Top Event can be 
calculated. This requires 
knowledge of probable 
failure rates. At an OR gate 
the probabilities must be 
added to give the probability 
of the next event, whereas at 
an AND gate, the 
probabilities are multiplied. 
This is a powerful technique 
for identifying the failures 
that have the greatest 
influence on bringing about 
the End Event. 
     Fig 2.3: Quantification of FTA 
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Fig. 2.4: FTA for gas explosion  
Example: Redundant fire pumps 
 
TOP event = No water from fire water 
system 
Causes for TOP event: 
  VF = Valve failure 
  G1 = No output from any of the fire pumps 
  G2 = No water from FP1  
  G3 = No water from FP2 
  FP1 = failure of FP1 
  EF = Failure of engine   
  FP2 = Failure of FP2 
 
Fig. 2.5: Fire Pump FTA  
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2.5.5 Event-tree Analysis (ETA): 
It is a logical, bottom-up graphical technique to determine outcomes from a single initiating 
hazardous event. The event tree is useful for determining the probability of each unwanted 
outcome resulting from a single initiating event. From this, one can determine which outcomes 
are the most severe or occur with the greatest frequency. The safety control measures associated 
with the system are used as headings across the top of the tree. The initiating event is then 
sequenced through the event tree with the associated control measures. Each control measure has 
two paths—operates or fail. Probabilities are determined for each of these paths. Event tree 
analysis is based on binary logic, in which an event either has or has not happened or a 
component has or has not failed. It is valuable in analyzing the consequences arising from a 
failure or undesired event. The consequences of the event are followed through a series of 
possible paths. Each path is assigned a probability of occurrence and the probability of the 
various possible outcomes can be calculated.  
Advantages: 
• Well suited for single events with multiple outcomes 
• Suited for high risks not amenable to simpler analysis methods 
Disadvantages: 
• Trees can grow large very quickly 
• Probabilities may be difficult to estimate  
• Can be extremely time-consuming 
The figure below depicts a simple event tree. The event tree starts with a single initiating event, a 
severed hydraulic line, and a frequency of event occurrence of .01 events per year (i.e., once every 
100 years). 
Fig. 2.6:  The basic event tree 
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Fig. 2.7: ETA for Gas Explosion 
2.5.6 Potential or Predictive Human Error Analysis: 
A team-based method similar in concept to HAZOP; however, this analysis focuses on human tasks 
and the associated error potential. Human error causes fall into the following basic categories: 
• Complexity – increases the likelihood of error 
• Stress – increases the likelihood of error 
• Fatigue – increases the likelihood of error 
• Environment – adverse environments increase the likelihood of error 
• Training – better training reduces the likelihood of error 
The members of the team conducting the analysis should consider these error causes as they conduct 
the analysis. The basic procedure is as follows: 
• Identify key human tasks 
• Apply the following guide words for each task: 
                     < Action omitted 
< Incomplete action 
< Incorrect action timing 
< Wrong action 
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< Wrong action sequence 
< Wrong selection 
< Action applied to the wrong interface object 
A worksheet can be used to document the results. It should include the following information: 
• Task 
• Error guide word(s) 
• Description 
• Error consequence 
• Strategy to prevent or reduce the error consequence 
Advantages: 
• The method can identify many potential errors 
• Validation studies show that a high portion of errors can be identified by thorough application of 
the method. 
Disadvantages: 
• Can be time-consuming if many tasks and actions exist 
• Effectiveness depends on the team‘s expertise and effort 
2.5.7 Operating and Support Analysis (O&SA): 
Operating and Support Analysis seeks to identify hazards during operation and maintenance, find the 
root causes, determine the acceptable level of risk, and recommend risk reductions. An 
understanding of the operations, environment, and support (maintenance) philosophy (i.e., training, 
implementation, etc.) that will be part of the mining process needs to be analyzed. The Operating and 
Support Analysis (O&SA) is used to identify hazards that may occur. The O&SA is conducted by a 
team familiar with the system‘s operation and interaction with humans. Some of the items to be 
considered include: 
• Operating during normal and abnormal conditions 
• Making changes to the system 
• Maintaining the equipment and software 
• Testing of the systems 
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• Training personnel on the use and maintenance of the systems 
• Providing adequate documentation for the systems 
Advantages: 
• Provides hazard identification in the context of the entire system operation 
Disadvantages: 
• Requires a high level of expertise concerning the system 
2.5.8 Action-Error Analysis (AEA): 
Action-error analysis (AEA) is used to identify operator errors and the subsequent consequences. 
AEA specifically focuses on the interactions between humans and the system during operation, 
maintenance, and testing. The basic procedure is outlined as follows for operation and maintenance 
tasks: 
• Identify operator tasks 
• Detail the subtasks and actions for each task 
• For each action, identify potential operator errors and consequences. As a guide, the following error 
types are considered for each action: 
                     < Error of omission (action not taken) 
< Wrong sequence of actions 
< Temporal errors (actions taken late or early) 
< Incorrect actions taken 
< Actions applied to the wrong interface object 
Advantages: 
• Well suited for automated or semi automated processes with operator interfaces 
Disadvantages: 
• Requires a high level of expertise concerning the system 
2.5.9 Interface Analysis: 
Interface analysis is used to identify hazards resulting from physical, functional, logical, and 
temporal interface incompatibilities. Interface analysis is applicable to all systems and interfaces. 
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Numerous interfaces exist such as human-machine, hardware-software, hardware-hardware, and 
system-environment. The types of interface incompatibilities include: 
• Environmental (temperature, moisture, dust, and vibration) 
• Electrical (EMI, power sources, supply voltages, and data signals) 
• Physical (rate and range of movement) 
• Logical (conditional responses based on Boolean expressions) 
• Temporal (clock times, response times, and delay times) Incompat ibilities can exist between 
adjacent, interconnected, interdependent, or interacting system elements. 
Advantages: 
• Applicable to all systems 
• Applicable to all types of interfaces 
• Applicable at the subsystem to the component level 
Disadvantages: 
• Difficult to apply to large or complex systems 
• Difficult to find all types of interface incompatibilities for every operation 
2.5.10 Sequentially Timed Events Plot (STEP) Investigation System: 
STEP is an event-driven approach to define systems, analyze operation, and investigate mishaps. 
STEP is an analytical approach that graphically depicts sequentially timed events. Events are defined 
with formatted ―building blocks‖ composed of an ―actor and action.‖ The event blocks are 
sequentially linked to graphically depict the flow of events that produce an outcome. The graphical 
depiction is useful for analyzing and defining events for a given system. STEP analysis can help 
discover and analyze problems; the analysis is also useful for assessing mitigation options. STEP is 
also used to analyze the types and sequences of events that lead to an incident. 
Advantages: 
• Can be applied to define and systematically analyze complex systems or processes 
• Facilitates focus group analysis 
Disadvantages: 
• Perceived as complicated and expensive to implement 
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2.6 ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT  
Fig 2.8: Flowchart for ERA 
 
Environmental risk assessment (ERA) involves the examination of risks resulting from natural 
events (flooding, extreme weather events, etc.), technology, practices, processes, products, 
agents (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) and industrial activities that may pose threats to 
ecosystems, animals and people. Environmental health risk assessment addresses human health 
concerns and ecological risk assessment addresses environmental media and organisms. ERA is 
predominantly a scientific activity and involves a critical review of available data for the purpose 
of identifying and possibly quantifying the risks associated with a potential threat.  
 
Identification of an emerging issue or priority for further action can result in a demand for ERA 
to determine whether an initial indication of a problem is valid or not. ERA provides the basis for 
most legislative and regulatory programs as well as for international agreements to address 
identified threats. If a threat to human health or the environment is identified through ERA, risk 
management is performed to consider the need to impose measures to control or manage the risk.  
 
While science remains an important factor at this third stage, other key factors must also be 
considered such as: socio-economic considerations; the availability of alternative technology, 
products, practices, processes, etc.; 40 international comparisons and impacts; and 
communication and consultation with the public and stakeholders that will be affected by 
proposed changes. In many ways, this stage is the most complex. 
 
 
 
 2.6.1 Acid Mine Drainage: 
Acid mine drainage (AMD), or acid rock drainage (ARD), refers to the outflow of acidic 
water from (usually) abandoned metal mines or coal mines. However, other areas where the 
earth has been disturbed (e.g. construction sites, subdivisions, transportation corridors, etc.) 
may also contribute acid rock drainage to the environment. In many localities the liquid that 
drains from coal stocks, coal handling facilities, coal washeries, and even coal waste tips can 
be highly acidic, and in such cases it is treated as acid rock drainage. Acid rock drainage 
occurs naturally within most environments as part of the rock weathering process but is 
exacerbated by large-scale earth disturbances characteristic of mining and other large 
construction activities, usually within rocks containing an abundance of sulfide minerals. 
OCCURRENCE 
Sub-surface mining often progresses below the water table, so water must be constantly 
pumped out of the mine in order to prevent flooding. When a mine is abandoned, the 
pumping ceases, and water floods the mine. This introduction of water is the initial step in 
most acid rock drainage situations. Tailings piles or ponds may also be a source of acid rock 
drainage. 
After being exposed to air and water, oxidation of metal sulfides (often pyrite, which is iron-
sulfide) within the surrounding rock and overburden generates acidity. Colonies of bacteria 
and archaea greatly accelerate the decomposition of metal ions, although the reactions also 
occur in an abiotic environment. These microbes, called extremophiles for their ability to 
survive in harsh conditions, occur naturally in the rock, but limited water and oxygen supplies 
usually keep their numbers low. Special extremophiles known as acidophiles especially favor 
the low pH levels of abandoned mines. In particular, Acidithiobacillus ferrooxidans is a key 
contributor to pyrite oxidation. 
Metal mines may generate highly acidic discharges where the ore is a sulfide or is associated 
with pyrites. In these cases the predominant metal ion may not be iron but rather zinc, copper, 
or nickel. The most commonly-mined ore of copper, chalcopyrite, is itself a copper-iron-
sulfide and occurs with a range of other sulfides. Thus, copper mines are often major culprits 
of ARD. 
CHEMISTRY 
The chemistry of oxidation of pyrites, the production of ferrous ions and subsequently ferric 
ions, is very complex, and this complexity has considerably inhibited the design of effective 
treatment options. 
Although a host of chemical processes contribute to ARD, pyrite oxidation is by far the 
greatest contributor. A general equation for this process is: 
4FeS2(s) + 14O2(g) + 4H2O(l) → 4Fe
2+
(aq) + 8SO4
2-
(aq) + 8H
+
(aq)  
The solid pyrite, when introduced to oxygen and water, is catalyzed to form Iron(II) ions, 
sulfate ions, and hydrogen ions. The hydrogen ions bind to the sulfate ions to produce 
sulfuric acid. 
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EFFECTS 
EFFECTS ON PH 
In some ARD systems temperatures reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit (50 °C), and the pH can be 
as low as -3.6. ARD-causing organisms can thrive in waters with pH very close to zero. 
Negative pH occurs when water evaporates from already acidic pools thereby increasing the 
concentration of hydrogen ions. 
About half of the coal mine discharges in Pennsylvania have pH under 5 standard units. 
However, a significant portion of mine drainage in both the bituminous and anthracite regions 
of Pennsylvania is alkaline, because limestone in the overburden neutralizes acid before the 
drainage emanates. 
HEAVY METAL CONTAMINATION 
Many acid rock discharges also contain elevated levels of toxic metals, especially nickel and 
copper with lower levels of a range of other heavy metal ions such as lead, arsenic, 
aluminium, and manganese. In the coal belt around the south Wales valleys in the UK highly 
acidic nickel-rich discharges from coal stocking sites have proved to be particularly 
troublesome. 
TREATMENT 
OVERSIGHT 
In the United Kingdom, many discharges from abandoned mines are exempt from regulatory 
control. In such cases the Environment Agency working with partners has provided some 
innovative solutions, including constructed wetland solutions such as on the River Pelena in 
the valley of the River Afan near Port Talbot. 
Although abandoned underground mines produce most of the ARD, some recently mined and 
reclaimed surface mines have produced ARD and have degraded local ground-water and 
surface-water resources. Acidic water produced at active mines must be neutralized to 
achieve pH 6-9 before discharge from a mine site to a stream is permitted. 
In Canada, work to reduce the effects of ARD is concentrated under the Mine Environment 
Neutral Drainage (MEND) program. Total liability from acid rock drainage is estimated to be 
between $2 billion and $5 billion CAD. Over a period of eight years, MEND claims to have 
reduced ARD liability by up to $400 million CAD, from an investment of $17.5 million 
CAD. 
METHODS 
Carbonate neutralization: Generally, limestone or other calcareous strata that could 
neutralize acid are lacking or deficient at sites that produce acidic rock drainage. 
Limestone chips may be introduced into sites to create a neutralizing effect. Where 
limestone has been used, such as at Cwm Rheidol in mid Wales, the positive impact has 
been much less than anticipated because of the creation of an insoluble calcium sulfate 
layer on the limestone chips, blinding the material and preventing further neutralization.  
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Ion exchange: Cation exchange processes were investigated as a potential treatment for 
ARD. Not only would ion exchangers remove potentially toxic heavy metals from mine 
runoff, there was also the possibility of turning a profit off of the recovered metals. 
However, the cost of ion exchange materials compared to the relatively small returns, as 
well as the inability of current technology to efficiently deal with the vast amounts of 
mine discharge, renders this solution unrealistic at present.  
 
Constructed wetlands: Constructed wetlands systems have shown promise as a more 
cost-effective treatment alternative to artificial treatment plants. A spectrum of bacteria 
and archaea, in consortium with wetland plants, may be used to filter out heavy metals 
and raise pH. Anaerobic bacteria in particular are known to be capable of reverting 
sulfate ions into sulfide ions. These sulfide ions can then bind with heavy metal ions, 
precipitating heavy metals out of solution and effectively reversing the entire process.  
Interestingly enough, T. ferrooxidans - the very bacteria which appears to be the problem - 
has also been shown to be effective in treating heavy metals in constructed wetland treatment 
systems. 
The attractiveness of a constructed wetlands solution lies in its passivity - building an 
artificial wetlands is a relatively cheap one-time investment which continuously works to 
reduce acidity and heavy metal concentration. Although promising, constructed wetlands take 
much time to completely cleanse an area, and are simply not enough to deal with extensively 
polluted discharge. Constructed wetland effluent often requires additional treatment to 
completely stabilize pH. Also, the products of bacterial processes are unstable when exposed 
to oxygen, and require special disposal to ensure no further contamination. Other issues 
include seasonal variation in the activity of cleansing organisms, as well as the lack of a 
practical passive means of moving mine discharge through the most efficient regions of 
purification. 
Active Treatment with Aeration 
In some discharges, HCO3-, a base, enters into the runoff from the breakdown of organic 
matter in the mine, such as mine timbers, or from the groundwater interaction with limestone. 
The base then neutralizes the acid in the runoff, forming carbonic acid. 
H
+
 + HCO3
-
 = H2CO3. (1) 
When this solution reaches the ground surface, the water is exposed to the air and the 
dissolved CO2 will degas into the atmosphere. This lowers the concentration of CO2, 
allowing more H2CO3 to decompose, which in turn allows the neutralization of more acid. 
H2CO3 = H2O + CO2. (2) 
The rise in pH promotes the oxidation of the iron and the formation of iron hydroxide, which 
will precipitate out of the solution, leaving little iron left in the water. Large air pumps and 
diffuser tubes can be used to allow more CO2 to outgas, and thus precipitate more iron out of 
the solution. This explained method can only work, however, for runoff which is naturally 
basic. 
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2.6.2 Fire Risk Assessment: 
During a risk assessment, hazards are evaluated in terms of the likelihood that a problem may occur 
and the damage it might cause. Mine fire preparedness requires consideration of all possible fires that 
could occur. However, at a given mine some fires are more likely than others and some would result 
in greater damage than would others. Conducting a risk analysis identifies these differences. The 
results can be used to target resources at the types of fires that are most likely and/or are most 
destructive. Hazards that are very likely to result in fires that would do considerable damage to 
people and property should be targeted first for remediation and/or effective response if remediation 
isn't possible. Potential fires that are less likely or that would have less severe consequences are 
identified for attention later, after the more serious situations have been addressed. 
Steps for fire risk assessment: 
Step 1: Choose the group that will conduct the analysis: The people involved in this 
activity should be knowledgeable about the area of the mine that is being assessed. For 
example, at one mine, fire brigade members conducted a fire risk assessment of the entire 
property. Alternatively, each crew could analyze their work areas for hazards. Other groups, 
like mine rescue teams, fire bosses, safety committee representatives, safety professionals, 
and/or supervisors, may be included. If many are people conducting analyses, each should be 
assigned to areas he or she knows well. The findings from various sources can be combined 
for a detailed mine site analysis. 
Step 2: Define the geographic area to be included: Some examples of areas that could be 
selected for analysis include a mining section, specific underground areas, the pit, a 
maintenance shop, or all of the mine property. 
If a large area is selected, it is best to subdivide it into smaller parts and, then, combine the 
results later. One way to choose the areas to be included is to ask the group where they think 
a fire would cause the most problems. Conduct an analysis of each problem at the area 
identified and combines these results to assess the hazards in the larger area. 
Step 3: Identify all of the possible fire hazards that exist in the area selected for study: 
Start by determining all of the sources of ignition in the study area and organize them with 
the help of the attached form called Potential Fires. Notice across the top of this form is labels 
for general types of fire like electrical and frictional. Under each general label, trainees 
should list all of the specific sources of ignition of this type that can be found in the 
geographic area being analyzed. For example, under the label electrical list power centers, fan 
motors, etc. and under the frictional label belt rollers or the belt on a motor may be identified. 
Be as specific as possible when listing fire hazards. 
Step 4: Evaluate the Risks: While there might be many ways of assessing risk, recent 
literature suggests using two concepts, that is, probability of occurrence, and severity of 
effects. For each fire hazard identified in Step 3, a judgement about the probability of a fire 
being caused by that ignition source and the severity of the consequences should be made.  
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The Fire Hazard Risk Matrix can be used to record a risk rating for each fire hazard identified 
in the terms high, medium, or low. To use this assessment, several concepts must be 
understood: 
Hazard - any situation that has fire potential.  
Probability - likelihood that the particular hazard will result in a fire. 
Severity - an estimation of how serious the potential problem might be in terms of harm to 
people and/or damage to property. 
It must be remembered when rating to consider secondary incidents that can occur as a result 
of the initial incident. For example, a small fire on the surface at an underground coal mine 
may cause electric power interruption to one mine fan in a multiple fan ventilation system. 
This may, in turn, cause major changes in ventilation underground and result in 
accumulations of methane in areas of the mine where it is commonly not found. An explosion 
hazard now exists. 
In summary, to assess risk: 
(a) Identify a source of ignition; 
(b) Determine whether the probability is high, medium, or low that this source will actually 
cause a fire; and  
(c) Determine if the risk of the severity to life, property, and the environment is high, 
medium, or low. 
Step 5: Use Hazard Ratings During Resource Allocation: According to this risk matrix, 
those hazards deemed to have the greatest probability for occurring and the greatest severity 
to the operation should be considered as high/high risk hazards. They should be the top 
priority for future training, mitigation, and/or response preparation efforts. One way to 
organize the findings is to take the completed Fire Hazard Risk Matrix forms, organize them 
from high/high risk to low/low risk, and put them in a notebook. Once a hazard is addressed, 
the corresponding form can be moved to the back of the notebook, and then the focus should 
turn to the next hazard. This process should continue until all identified hazards have been 
addressed. 
Step 6: The task of risk assessment is an on-going activity: Any time the work 
environment changes, update the risk assessment and re-evaluate the priorities. A risk 
assessment is most useful if it is never considered finished. Instead, think of it as a draft 
document that needs to be up-dated as things change. 
Risk Index of Mining Parameters: 
Attempts are in progress in certain countries to make the rating of spontaneous fire risk 
involved in mining parameters, along with the inherent spontaneous heating tendency of the 
coal concerned. Amongst them, the Polish method formulated from statistical analyses of 
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incidences of fires by Olpinski. and that suggested by Feng, Chakravorty and Cochrainc in 
Canada and attempts by Banerjee, and Tiwari in India are worth mentioning. 
Polish Method: 
Olpinski in Poland defined the mining parameters into Seven different types of basic factors, 
designated as S1 to S7. They then formulated risk index as: 
P =Sz(b)+ (S1+S2 + S3 + S4 + S5 + S6 + S7) 
where, 
P= Probability of lire risk involved in a particular situation of mining. 
S1 = Coal left in mines, goaf. 
S2 System method of mining, 
S3 = Ventilation method, 
S4= Scope for leakage of air within (the goaf etc.), 
S5= Degree of wetness of coal seam. 
S6= Depth of the concerned mine/ presence of rocks etc., 
S7= intensity/degree of ventilation, and 
Sz(b)= Spontaneous heating susceptibility of the coal concerned and rated in the form of 
numbers 
The degree of spontaneous fire risk involved for different situations from S1 to S7 were 
assigned definite numerical values, varying from — 15 to + 15, depending on risk rating. P 
values greater than 120 is considered rather unsafe in Polish mining practices and necessary 
preventive measures and reorganisation of mining conditions are recommended in such cases. 
Canada: 
Feng, Chakravorty and Cochraine said:  
Fire Risk index =Liability index of the coal x Environmental index. 
The spontaneous heating susceptibility of the coal, measures the liability index. They 
assessed environmental index by considering only the three mining factors e.g. coal loss, 
fissure formation and ventilation pressure difference of the particular situation In case of any 
deviation from the normal values of the above factors favouring spontaneous heating they 
indicated increment in the values of environmental index and thereby estimated the lire risk 
index shown in the following table. 
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Fig. 2.9: Environmental Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.10: Fire hazard Matrix 
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2.7 RISK MANAGEMENT: 
2.7.1 Safety Management Systems 
A Safety Management System (SMS) consists of comprehensive sets of policies, procedures 
and practices designed to ensure that barriers to unwanted incidents are in place, in use and 
are effective. An integrated SMS focuses on both the traditional OHS area and on 
management of engineering safety. The SMS tends to integrate all aspects of safety into the 
ongoing activities of everyone involved in the operations—from the operator to the chief 
executive officer. The responsibility for safety is both individual and collective.  
There are several models for SMS, mostly similar. Most of the models have been based on 
the principle of the quality systems approach described in ISO 9001, i.e. development of a set 
of core elements, a set of sub-elements under each core element, a set of supporting 
procedures for each sub-element and, finally, definition of the interactions and overlaps 
between sub-elements and procedures.  
 
 
Fig. 2.11: Quantitative Risk Analysis Module 
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Fig. 2.12: Risk Management Framework 
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Fig. 2.13: Safety Management System 
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2.7.2 Characteristics of Safety Management Systems 
The major characteristics of SMS are:  
• It is the principal vehicle for day to day management of all aspects of safety in the 
operations.  
• Its focus is not only on personnel safety, but also ensuring operational integrity and 
minimizing business interruptions, even if no one was injured.  
• It outlines a set of procedures for everyone to follow (depending on their roles and 
responsibilities, a select set of procedures may apply to each operating group), is system-
dependent and NOT individual-dependent.  
• It contains a list of safety critical equipment, and how these are maintained to required 
operational integrity through safety critical activities. The activities, procedures, schedules 
and responsibilities are defined.  
• It lists a set of performance indicators to monitor the integrity of the safety critical activities 
being undertaken correctly and according to schedule.  
• It outlines an auditing and feedback regime for management control of hazards. It should be 
recognised that without a formal well-defined SMS, followed by adequate training, 
implementation and monitoring, major hazards are impossible to manage of a PE system. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
3.0 MPQRA: Mine Process Quantitative Risk Analysis 
 
3.1 Scope  
 
Prevention of human and property losses is integral to the operation and management of 
Mining processes. This may be achieved through the selection of a technology that is 
inherently safe. Alternatively safety of design and/or operation can be audited by the 
application of hazard identification and risk analysis techniques, and adopting measures 
suggested by the analysis. The latter approach constitutes Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA). 
This section describes specific techniques that can help in attaining such objectives. The 
overall methodology presented in this code allows systematic identification of hazards as well 
as quantification of the risks associated with the operation of processes. Applied with the due 
expertise and rigor the prescribed methodology can help the user understand the relative 
levels of hazards and risk potential in an installation. This aids the selection and prioritization 
of necessary strategies for accident prevention and limiting their consequences. Therefore, 
the code can be used for improving plant safety performance as well as to reduce human and 
property losses.  
Risk Analysis is a process that consists of a number of sequential steps as follows:  
1. Hazard Identification: Identifying sources of process accidents involving release of 
hazardous material in the atmosphere, and the various ways (i.e., scenarios) they 
could occur.  
 
2. Consequence Assessment: Estimating the probably zone of impact of accidents as 
well as the scale and/or probability of damages with respect to human beings and 
plant equipment and other structures.  
 
3. Accident Frequency Assessment: Computation of the average likelihood of accidents.  
 
4. Risk Estimation: Combining accident consequence and frequency to obtain risk 
distribution within and beyond a process plant.  
The code describes the essential nature of each of above sequence of steps, and describes a 
variety of techniques for identifying hazards and the quantification of accident consequence 
and frequency towards the final risk estimation.  
The QRA is most applicable and provides meaningful results when a mine is built, operated 
and maintained as per design intent and good engineering practices.  
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3.1.1 Definitions: With reference to this document the following technical terms used are 
interpreted and understood as given below: 
 
Accident  A specific unplanned event or sequence of 
events that has undesirable consequences.  
Basic Event  A fault tree event that is sufficiently basic 
that no further development is necessary.  
Consequence  A measure of the expected effects of an 
incident.  
External Event  Event caused by a natural hazard (earth 
quake, flood, etc.) or man-induced events 
(aircraft crash, sabotage etc.).  
Frequency  Number of occurrences of an event per unit 
of time.  
Hazard  A characteristic of the system/plant process 
that represents a potential for an accident 
causing damage to people, property or 
environment.  
Initiating Event  The first event in an event sequence.  
Mitigation System  Equipment and/or procedures designed to 
respond to an accident event sequence by 
interfering with accident propagation and/or 
reducing the accident consequence.  
Probability  An expression for the likelihood of 
occurrence of an event or an event sequence 
during an interval of time or the likelihood 
of the success or failure of an event on test 
or on demand.  
Risk  A measure of potential economic loss or 
human injury in terms of the probability of 
the loss or injury occurring and magnitude 
of the loss or injury if it occurs.  
Top Event  The unwanted event or incident at the top of 
a fault tree that is traced downward to more 
basic failures using logic gates to determine 
causes and likelihood 
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  Fig 3.1: Stages of Mining Process and Risk Analysis  
The life span of a process industry comprises a number of stages from conceptual to 
decommissioning. Each stage of a Mine may have hazards - some general and some stage-
specific. Hazard identification and risk analysis techniques that may be applied at different 
stages of a plant are as given above. 
 
3.2 Component Methods of MPQRA 
 
3.2.1 Incident Frequencies from the Historical Record  
 
Purpose. In many cases, the incident frequency information required in a full or partial 
MPQRA can be obtained directly from the historical record. The number of recorded 
incidents can be divided by the exposure period (e.g., plant years, pipeline mile-years) to 
estimate a failure estimate of the frequency. This is a straightforward technique that provides 
directly the top event frequency without the need for detailed frequency modeling. Event 
probabilities can similarly be estimated for inclusion in event tree analysis. We use the term 
likelihood for the numerical output of this technique; frequencies or probabilities may be 
derived using this approach. The units of frequency are the  number of events expected per 
unit time. Probabilities are dimensionless and can be used to describe the likelihood of an 
event during a specified time interval (e.g., 1 year) or the conditional probability that an event 
will occur, given that some precursor event has happened. 
Technology. The historical approach is based on records and incident frequencies and is not 
limited by the imagination of the analyst in deriving failure mechanisms, as might be the case 
with fault tree analysis. Conversely, rare incidents may not have occurred  unless the 
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population of items is very large. However, a number of criteria have to be satisfied for the 
historical likelihood to be meaningful. These include sufficient and accurate records and 
applicability of the historical data to the particular process under review. Provided these 
criteria are met, which is often difficult, the frequency information is relatively 
straightforward to calculate. Its simplicity should give added confidence to senior 
management and others who must review the MPQRA. 
Applications. The historical frequency technique is applicable for a number of important 
cases in MPQRA. It is often used early in the design stage, before details of systems and 
safeguards and defined. Similarly, the technique is ideal where failure causes are very diverse 
and difficult to predict, such as with transportation incidents. The simplicity of approach 
(given suitability of the data) allows quick, economical frequency estimates to be generated. 
Limited safety resources can then be directed to other important parts of consequence 
analysis, risk evaluation. 
 
3.2.2. Description of the Technique 
 
 The historical approach is summarized by a five-step methodology. 
1. Define context. 
2. Review source data. 
3. Check data applicability. 
4. Calculate incident frequency. 
5. Validate frequency. 
 
Step 1 Define Context. The historical approach may be applied at any stage of a design—
conceptual, preliminary, or detailed design—or to an existing facility. After the MPQRA has 
been defined, the next two steps, system description and hazard identification, should be 
completed to provided the details necessary to define the incident list. These steps are 
potentially iterative as the historical record is an important input to hazard identification. The 
output of this step is a clear specification of the incidents for which frequency estimates are 
sought. 
Step 2. Review Source Data. All relevant historical data sources should be consulted. The 
data may be found in company records, government, or industry group statistics. It is unlikely 
that component reliability databases will be of much use for major incident frequencies. The 
source data should be reviewed for completeness and independence. Lists of incidents will 
almost certainly be incomplete and some judgment will have to be used in this regard. The 
historical period must be of sufficient length to provide a statistically significant sample size. 
Differences in data gathering techniques and variation in data quality must also be evaluated. 
Incident frequencies derived from lists containing only one or two incidents of a particular 
type will have large uncertainties. When multiple data sources are used, duplicate incidents 
must be eliminated. Sometimes, the data source will provide details of the total plant or item 
exposure. Where the exposure is not available, it will have to be estimated from the total 
number and age of processes in operation. 
Step 3. Check Data Applicability. The historical record may include data over long periods of 
time (5 or more years). As the technology and scale may have changed in the period, careful 
review of the source data to confirm applicability is important. It is a common mistake for 
designers to be overconfident that relatively small design changes will greatly reduce failure 
frequencies. In addition, larger scale plants (those that employ new technology such as heat 
recovery) or special local environmental factors may introduce new hazards not apparent in 
the historical record, It is commonly necessary to review incident descriptions and discard 
those failures not relevant to the plant and scenario under review. 
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Fig. 3.2: Historical Approach 
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Step 4. Calculate Event Likelihood. When the data are confirmed as applicable and the 
incidents and exposure are consistent, the historical frequency can be obtained by dividing 
the number of incidents by the exposed population. Where the historical data and the mine 
under review are not totally consistent, it is necessary to exercise judgment to increase or 
decrease the incident frequency.  
Step 5. Validate Frequency. It is often possible to compare the calculated incident frequency 
with a known population of plant or equipment not used for data generation. This is a useful 
check as it can highlight an obvious mistake or indicate that some special feature has not 
received adequate treatment. 
Theoretical Foundation. The main assumption of the technique is that the historical record 
is complete and the population from which the incidents are drawn is appropriate and 
sufficiently large for the event likelihoods to be statistically significant. The record of 
reported occurrences should include the significant failure modes that are difficult to analyze,  
such as human factors, common-cause failures, management systems, and industrial 
sabotage. 
Input Requirements and Availability. Historical data have diverse sources and may be 
difficult to acquire. Data are of two types: incident data and plant or item exposure periods.  
Output. The output from this analysis is a numerical value for the event likelihood, 
sometimes with an indication of error bounds. In the case of a frequency value, this is 
equivalent to the top event value in a fault tree analysis. If the output is a probability (e.g., the 
likelihood of a flash fire vs. an unconfined explosion from a flammable vapor cloud), it may 
be used directly for risk calculations. 
Simplified Approaches. Many analysts use a default set of historical event likelihoods that 
they have collected over the years from previous projects and studies. This obviates the need 
to go back to original sources when a detailed analysis is not required, and it may be suitable 
for MPQRA at an early stage. 
 
3.2.3 Discussion: 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses. The main strength of the technique is that the use of historical 
event data, where the accumulated experience is relevant and statistically meaningful, has 
great "depth‖ as it will include most significant routes leading to the event. Also, it has a high 
degree of credibility with non specialist users, who have to base important decisions on the 
MPQRA. The main weakness relates to accuracy and applicability. Technological change, 
either in the scale of plant or the design (materials, process chemistry, energy recovery) may 
make some historical data inapplicable. 
Identification and Treatment of Possible Errors. The main source of error in the 
estimation of likelihoods for the historical record is the use of data that are inappropriate or 
too sparse to give statistically meaningful results. Often there are good data on the number of 
incidents or failures, but poor data on the population in which these failures have occurred. 
For these cases, it is necessary to adopt modeling techniques such as fault tree analysis.  
Utility. The technique is not difficult to apply, although data gathering can be time 
consuming and extremely difficult in cases of mine accidents. The time required to estimate 
an incident frequency from historical data can be reduced if the company/user assembles and 
keeps updated a database of the historical incident data.  
Resources. The analyst should be an engineer because technical judgment is involved. This 
is especially important when checking for appropriateness of the data before acting on it. An 
in-house information scientist may be able to assist in data gathering. However, it may be 
more time and cost effective to use consultants for unusual problems (specialist firms exist 
for railway, maritime, and other industry-related incident studies). Industry associations may 
be able to assist in identification of such expertise. 
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3.2.4 Risk Measures 
 
Risk is a measure of economic loss, human injury or environmental damage in terms of both 
the likelihood and the magnitude of the loss, injury or damage. Measures describe risk 
measures which estimate risk of human fatality caused by the immediate impact of an 
accident—fire, explosion, or toxic material release. Other kinds of risk which might result 
from chemical process incidents are not discussed. Examples of types of risk not considered 
in this book include, for example: 
• the long-term health effects arising from a single exposure to a toxic gas, which does not 
cause immediate serious injury or fatality 
• the health effects of chronic exposure to chemical vapors in the atmosphere over a long time 
period 
• the health effects of acute or chronic exposure to chemicals by various environmental routes 
such as drinking water contamination, environmental contamination, food supply 
contamination, and other mechanisms. 
In MPQRA, a number of numerically different measures of risk can be derived from the same 
set of incident frequency and consequence data. These different risk measures characterize 
risk from different viewpoints, for example: 
• risk to an individual vs. risk to a group 
• risk to varying populations 
• simple risk measures containing less information vs. complex measures containing a great 
deal of information about risk distribution. 
This section discusses three commonly used ways of combining incident frequency and 
consequence data to produce risk estimates: 
• Risk indices are single numbers or tabulations of numbers which are correlated to the 
magnitude of risk. Some risk indices are relative values with no specific units, which only 
have meaning within the context of the risk index calculation methodology. Other risk indices 
are calculated from various individual or societal risk data sets and represent a condensation 
of the information contained in the corresponding data set. Risk indices are easy to explain 
and present, but contain less information than other, more complex measures. 
• Individual risk measures can be single numbers or a set of risk estimates for various 
individuals or geographic locations. In general, they consider the risk to an individual who 
may be in the effect zone of an incident or set of incidents. The size of the incident, in terms 
of the number of people impacted by a single event, does not affect individual risk, Individual 
risk measures can be single numbers, tables of numbers, or various graphical summaries. 
• Societal risk measures are single number measures, tabular sets of numbers, or graphical 
summaries which estimate risk to a group of people located in the effect zone of an incident 
or set of incidents. Societal risk estimates include a measure of incident size (for example, in 
terms of the number of people impacted by the incident or set of incidents considered). Some 
societal risk measures are designed to reflect the observation that people tend to be more 
concerned about the risk of large incidents than small incidents, and may place a greater 
weight on large incidents. 
 
Risk Indices 
Bask indices are single numbers or tabulations, and they may be used in either an absolute or 
a relative sense. Some risk indices represent simplifications of more complex risk measures, 
and have units which have real physical meaning (fatal accident rate, individual hazard index, 
average rate of death). Others are pure indices which have no meaningful units, but which are 
intended to rank different risks relative to each other (Equivalent Social Cost Index, Mortality 
Index, Dow Fire and Explosion Index). 
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Limitations on the use of indices are that  
(1) there may not be absolute criteria for  accepting or rejecting the risk, and  
(2) indices lack resolution and do not communicate  the same information as individual or 
societal risk measures. Consequence indices [e.g., Dow Fire and Explosion and Chemical 
Exposure Indices (Dow, 1994a, b)], consider risk only in a relative sense. As an example of a 
use of risk indices for relative assessment, a table may be developed that compares the 
equivalent social cost for a range of possible risk reduction measures; this permits a ranking 
of these measures on the basis of social benefit. Examples of the use of risk indices in 
absolute ways are the fatal accident rate (FAR) targets that some companies have established. 
• The Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) (Lees, 1980) is the estimated number of fatalities per 108 
exposure hours (roughly 1000 employee working lifetimes). The FAR is a single number 
index that is directly proportional to the average individual risk. The only difference 
numerically is the time period, which is 1 year for the average individual risk, so the FAR 
must be multiplied by a factor of 108/(24 x 365) = 1.14 x 104. 
• The Individual Hazard Index (IHI) (Helmers and Schaller, 1982) is the FAR for a particular 
hazard, with the exposure time defined as the actual time that a person is exposed to the 
hazard of concern. The IHI estimates peak risk. 
• The Average Rate of Death (Lees, 1980) is defined as the average number of fatalities that 
might be expected per unit time from all possible incidents. It is also known as the accident 
fatality number. Average Rate of Death is a single number average measure of societal risk. 
• The Equivalent Social Cost Index (Okrent, 1981) is a modification of the Average Rate of 
Death and takes into account society's aversion to large-consequence incidents. 
• The Mortality Index or Number (Marshall, 1987) is used to characterize the potential 
hazards of toxic material storage. It is based on the observed average ratio of casualties to the 
mass of material or energy released, as derived from the historical record. It is actually a 
hazard index rather than a risk index as frequency of occurrence is not incorporated. 
• The Dow Fire and Explosion Index (Dow, 1994a) and the Mond Index (ICI, 1985) estimate 
relative risk from fires and explosions. These indices can also be used to estimate the 
magnitude of potential plant damage from a fire or explosion. 
• The Dow Chemical Exposure Index (Dow, 1994b) estimates risk associated with a single 
toxic chemical release. Tyler et al. (1996) have proposed an alternative toxicity hazard index. 
• The Economic Index measures financial loss and its development is outside the scope of 
this volume. The Economic Index may be treated and presented in essentially the same way 
as FAR. Companies may have developed specific economic risk targets, and the Economic 
Index can be compared with them. If there is no specific target, the relative merits of various 
risk reduction measures may be easily ranked. O'Mara, Greenburg, and Hessian (1991) give 
an example of economic risk calculation. 
 
Individual Risk 
Considine (1984) defines individual risk as the risk to a person in the vicinity of a hazard. 
This includes the nature of the injury to the individual, the likelihood of the injury occurring, 
and the time period over which the injury might occur.  
While injuries are of great concern, there are limited data available on the degrees of injuries. 
Thus, risk analysts often estimate risk of irreversible injury or fatality, for which more 
statistics are recorded. Individual risk can be estimated for the most exposed individual, for 
groups of individuals at particular places or for an average individual in an effect zone. For a 
given incident or set of incidents, these individual risk measures have different values. 
Definitions of some individual risk measures are given below. 
1. Individual risk contours show the geographical distribution of individual risk. The risk 
contours show the expected frequency of an event capable of causing the specified level of 
harm at a specified location, regardless of whether or not anyone is present at that location to 
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suffer that harm. Thus, individual risk contour maps are generated by calculating individual 
risk at every geographic location, assuming that somebody will be present and subject to the 
risk 100% of the time (i.e., annual exposure of 8760 hours per year). 
2. Maximum individual risk is the individual risk to the person(s) exposed to the highest risk 
in an exposed population. This is often the operator working at the unit being analyzed, but 
might also be the person in the general population living at the location of highest risk. 
Maximum individual risk can be determined from risk contours by locating the person most 
at risk and determining what the individual risk is at that point. Alternatively it can be 
determined by calculating individual risk at every geographical location where people are 
present and searching the results for the maximum value. 
3. Average individual risk (exposed population) is the individual risk averaged over the 
population that is exposed to risk from the facility (e.g., all of the operators in a building, or 
those people within the largest incident effect zone). This risk measure is only useful if the 
risk is relatively uniformly distributed over the population, and can be extremely misleading 
if risk is not evenly distributed. If a few individuals are exposed to a very high risk, this may 
not be apparent when averaged with a large number of people at low risk. 
4. Average individual risk (total population) is the individual risk averaged over a 
predetermined population, without regard to whether or not all people in that population are 
actually exposed to the risk. This average risk measure is potentially extremely misleading. If 
the population selected is too large, an artificially low estimate of average individual risk will 
result because much of the population might be at no risk from the facility under study. 
5. Average individual risk (exposed hours/worked hours). The individual risk for an activity 
may be calculated for the duration of the activity or may be averaged over the working day. 
For example, if an operator spends 1 hr per shift sampling a reactor and 7 hr per shift in the 
control room, the individual risk while sampling would be 8 times the average individual risk 
for the entire work day, assuming no risk for the time in the control room. 
 
Societal Risk 
Some major incidents have the potential to affect many people. Societal risk is a measure of 
risk to a group of people. It is most often expressed in terms of the frequency distribution of 
multiple casualty events. However, societal risk can also be expressed in terms similar to 
individual risk. For example, the likelihood of 10 fatalities at a specific location x, y is a type 
of societal risk measure. The calculation of societal risk requires the same frequency and 
consequence information as individual risk. Additionally, societal risk estimation requires a 
definition of the population at risk around the facility. This definition can include the 
population type (e.g., residential, industrial, school), the likelihood of people being present, 
or mitigation factors. Individual and societal risks are different presentations of the same 
underlying combinations of incident frequency and consequences. Both of these measures 
may be of importance in assessing the benefits of risk reduction measures or in judging the 
acceptability of a facility in absolute terms. In general, it is impossible to derive one from the 
other. The underlying frequency and consequence information are the same, but individual 
and societal risk estimates can only be calculated directly from that basic data. 
The difference between individual and societal risk may be illustrated by the following 
example. An office building located near a chemical plant contains 40 people during office 
hours and 1 guard at other times. If the likelihood of an incident causing a fatality at the 
office building is constant throughout the day, each individual in that building is subject to a 
certain individual risk. This individual risk is independent of the  number of people present—
it is the same for each of the 400 people in the building during office hours and for the single 
guard at other times. However, the societal risk is significantly higher during office hours, 
when 400 people are affected, than at other times when a single person is affected. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0 Case Study 
 
Case studies of two mines, Ray Bachra in India and Crinum Mine in Australia have been 
compiled and studied for their applicability of risk assessment and dealing methods. While in 
India ‗probability, consequence and exposure‘ method has been used, in the Australian mine, 
hazard identification and removal process was practiced. 
 
4.1 Ray- Bachra U/G Mine, CCL, Jharkhand 
4.1.1 Risk Control Hierarchy 
Elimination-Modification to the process method or material to eliminate the hazard 
completely.  
Substitution -replace the material, substance or process with a less hazardous one.  
Separation-Isolating the hazard from persons by safeguarding, or by space or time 
separation. Administration-Adjusting the time or conditions of risk exposures  
Training-Improving skills therefore making tasks less hazardous to persons involved.  
Personal protective equipment-using as the last resort, appropriately designed and properly 
fitted equipment where other controls are not practicable. 
Remember the risk hierarchy is only a guide to the type of actions required. 
 
Table 4.1: Risk Rating Criteria 
 
Risk = Consequence x Exposure x Probability 
Maximum Risk Rating = 500 
Risks ≥20 to be referred to Management for Action 
Consequence Exposure Pobability 
Several Dead 5 Continuous 10 Expected/Almost 
Certain 
10 
One dead 1 Frequent 5 Quite Possible/Likely 7 
Significant chance of 
Fatality 
0.3 Seldom (Weekly) 
 
3 Unusual but possible 
 
3 
One Permanent 
Disability 
0.1 Unusual (Monthly) 2.5 Only remotely possible 2 
Small chance of 
fatality 
0.1 Occasionally 
(Yearly) 
2 Conceived but unlikely 1 
Many lost time 
Injuries 
0.01 Once in 5 years 1.5 Practically impossible 0.5 
One lost time injury 0.001 Once in 10 years 0.5 Virtually impossible 0.1 
small injury 0.0001 Once in 100 years 0.02   
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4.1.2 STEPS TO RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
STEP :1 Identification of all hazards associated with the mine 
STEP :2 Assessment of risk for prioritizing 
STEP :3: Rank and identify the principal hazards which need immediate attention. Rank 
those hazards which need continuous management. 
STEP : 4 Break all the hazards into different contributing mechanisms (Underlying 
causes) 
STEP : 5 Fine control each mechanism 
STEP : 6 Document procedure for each control 
STEP : 7 Fix responsibilities 
STEP : 8 Design auditing procedure 
Table 4.2: INITIAL HAZARD IDENTIFICATION FOR RAY- BACHRA U/G MINE, 
CCL 
No. 
Description of Hazard Consequence Probability Exposure Total 
Risk 
1 INUNDATION 5 10 10 500 
2 POOR QUALITY OF SUPPLIED 
MATERIAL 
5 10 10 500 
3 GEOLOGICAL DISTURBANCE 5 10 10 500 
4 IMPROPER STRATA CONTROL 5 7 10 350 
5 TRAINING FACILITIES INADEQUATE 5 7 10 350 
6 SHORTAGE OF SKILLED PERSON 5 7 10 350 
7 INADEQUATE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 5 7 10 350 
8 POOR SUPERVISION 5 7 5 175 
9 SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION 5 3 10 150 
10 IMPROPER SURVEYING 5 3 10 150 
11 EXPLOSIVES / BLASTING 5 3 5 75 
11 HAULAGE 1 7 10 70 
12 MACHINERY 1 7 10 70 
13 LACK OF AWARENESS 1 7 10 70 
14 SEALED OFF PANELS 5 3 2.5 37.5 
15 INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS 0.3 7 10 21 
16 USE OF UNCALIBRATED INSTRUMENT 1 7 3 21 
17 VENTILATION NOT TO PLAN 0.1 10 10 10 
18 OTHER FIRES 0.1 7 10 7 
20 
EXTERNAL THREAT 
0.01 7 2.50 0.175 
21 POOR ILLUMINATION 0.001 3 3 0.009 
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TABLE  4.3: IDENTIFYING MECHANISMS CONTRIBUTING PRINCIPAL HAZARDS AND 
RANKING 
 
No. Major Hazard Mechanism Cons. Prob. Expo. Risk 
1 INUNDATION - River Overflow above 
HFL 
- Waterlogged Working 
U/G 
- Inrush through 
subsidence cracks/BH 
5 
5 
5 
7 
2 
7 
10 
10 
2 
350 
100 
70 
2 POOR QUALITY OF 
SUPPLIED MATERIAL 
- Improper 
procurement 
procedure 
- Inspection procedure 
not followed 
- Improper Storage 
5 
5 
5 
7 
7 
3 
10 
10 
10 
350 
350 
150 
3 GEOLOGICAL 
DISTURBANCE 
- Presence of  Fault & 
Slip planes 
- Fractured Roof 
5 
5 
10 
10 
10 
10 
500 
500 
4 IMPROPER STRATA 
CONTROL 
- Failure to identify bad 
roof 
- Improper Dressing 
-  
- Improper Supervision 
-  
- Poor workmanship 
-  
- Non-superimposition  
of some pillars in 
contiguous working 
-  
- Inadequate Support 
Design 
- Poor quality of 
support material 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
 
5 
5 
10 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
 
3 
3 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
 
10 
10 
500 
350 
350 
350 
350 
350 
 
150 
150 
5 TRAINING FACILITIES 
INADEQUATE 
- Non-existence of skilled 
trg.  Schedule 
- Untrained trainers 
- Infrastructure not to the 
requirement 
- Non-existence of 
Feedback / Test 
5 
5 
5 
1 
7 
 
3 
10 
 
10 
10 
 
10 
10 
 
10 
350 
 
150 
500 
 
100 
6 SHORTAGE OF SKILLED 
OR AUTHORISED 
PERSON/DEPLOYMENT 
OF UNSKILLED PERSON 
- Absenteeism 
- Trg. not done as per 
requirement 
- Manpower Sanction  not 
as per requirement 
- Examination for 
workmanship certificate 
not done regularly 
1 
1 
5 
 
7 
7 
7 
 
5 
10 
10 
 
35 
70 
350 
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1 10 10 100 
7 INADEQUATE 
COMMUNICATION 
SYSTEM 
- Non-availability of spare 
parts 
- Inadequate Capacity of 
Exchange 
 
5 
5 
7 
10 
5 
10 
 
175 
500 
8 POOR SUPERVISION - Negligence/ Lack of 
commitment 
- Not having proper 
knowledge / Experience 
- Inadequate training 
- Shortage of Supervisors 
5 
5 
 
0.3 
5 
7 
3 
 
3 
7 
3 
3 
 
3 
5 
105 
45 
 
2.7 
175 
9 SPONTANEOUS 
COMBUSTION 
- Panel extraction beyond 
incubation period 
- More coal left in goaf 
- Improper management 
of subsidence area 
- Poor construction / 
maintenance of seals 
0.1 
0.1 
5 
5 
3 
10 
2 
3 
10 
10 
2.5 
10 
03 
10 
25 
150 
10 IMPROPER SURVEYING  - Calibration of instt. not 
being done regularly 
- Non-superimposition of 
some pillars formed 
earlier 
- Surveying not done in 
time 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
10 
 
3 
10 
 
10 
 
3 
100 
 
500 
 
45 
11 EXPLOSIVES/BLASTING - Not taking proper 
shelter especially with 
respect to contiguous 
working 
- Possibility of Blown 
through shots 
5 
 
 
5 
3 
 
 
3 
5 
 
 
5 
75 
 
 
75 
12 HAULAGE  - Poor quality of existing 
ropes & rollers 
- Safety devices not 
adequate 
1 
 
1 
3 
 
3 
10 
 
10 
30 
 
30 
13 MACHINERY - Maintenance schedule 
not followed 
- Temporary trailing cable 
joints 
- Bye-passing protective 
devices 
- Unskilled operators 
- Moving parts of 
machines 
1 
1 
5 
1 
1 
7 
7 
3 
3 
10 
10 
10 
5 
5 
10 
70 
70 
75 
15 
100 
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14 LACK OF AWARENESS - Non-existence of 
documented procedures 
- Improper / inadequate 
training 
- Improper 
communication 
- Inadequate Publicity / 
Objective not explained 
1 
 
1 
5 
1 
10 
 
3 
3 
3 
10 
 
5 
3 
3 
100 
 
15 
45 
09 
15 SEALED OFF PANELS 
 
 
 
 
 
- Improper management 
of subsidence area 
- Poor construction / 
maintenance of seals 
- Improper supervision 
- Improper sampling & 
analysis procedure.  
5 
 
5 
 
5 
5 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
2 
 
2.5 
 
10 
 
5 
10 
 
25 
 
150 
 
75 
100 
 
16 INADEQUATE SUPPLY 
OF SPARE PARTS 
- Improper procurement 
planning 
- Delay in procurement 
action 
- Importance not given to 
the indents 
1 
1 
1 
7 
7 
10 
5 
3 
10 
35 
21 
100 
17 USE OF UNCALIBRATED 
INSTRUMENT 
- Non-existence of 
calibration procedures 
- Non-existence of 
calibration 
infrastructure 
- Non availability of spare 
Instruments 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
7 
 
10 
 
7 
5 
 
5 
 
3 
175 
 
250 
 
105 
18 VENTILATION NOT TO 
PLAN 
- Delay in construction of 
stoppings 
- Tampering of ventilation 
devices 
- Poor construction of 
stoppings 
0.1 
 
0.1 
0.1 
7 
 
7 
3 
10 
 
10 
10 
7 
 
7 
3 
 
19 OTHER FIRES - Conveyor  Fire 
- Electrical  Fires 
- Fire during gas cutting 
- Spilled Off Lubricants 
0.3 
5 
1 
0.3 
2 
7 
3 
1 
3 
5 
2.5 
2 
1.8 
175 
7.5 
0.6 
20 EXTERNAL THREAT - Theft 
- Political issues  
0.01 
0.001 
7 
3 
3 
2 
0.21 
0.006 
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21 POOR ILLUMINATION - Non supply of spares 
- Tampering with light 
fittings 
0.01 
0.01 
7 
7 
3 
3 
0.21 
0.21 
 
 
Table 4.4: CONTROL MEASURES & PROCEDURES FOR RESPECTIVE 
MECHANISMS CONTRIBUTING HAZARDS 
 
Mechanism Control Procedure Existing 
Procedure 
Y/N 
Responsible 
Person 
INUNDATION 
-River Overflow above 
HFL 
 
 
-Waterlogged Working 
U/G 
 
-Inrush through 
subsidence 
   cracks / Borehole 
-Embankment  
-Float, Alarm, Guard & 
Wireless 
 
 
-Pumping, Dams & Inspection 
 
 
-Garland drain, Crack filling & 
Inspection 
-Water danger 
Procedure 
 
 
-Pumping Procedure 
 
 
-Subsidence mgt. 
Procedure 
Y 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
CE, Mgr., SO,  
 
 
P.Kh, CE, OM/MS, 
Colly. Engr. 
 
Surveyor, SO, 
Mgr. 
POOR QUALITY OF SUPPLIED MATERIAL 
-Improper procurement 
procedure 
 
-Inspection procedure 
not followed 
-Improper Storage 
-Agent to appraise competent 
authority for necessary steps 
 
-Agent to Ensure 
 
-Agent to ensure/appraise 
GM 
-To be prepared 
centrally 
 
 
-do - 
 
-Storage Procedure 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
Agent 
 
Agent 
 
SK, CE, Colly. 
Engr. 
 
GEOLOGICAL DISTURBANCE 
-Presence of Fault & 
Slip- 
 Planes 
 
-Fractured Roof 
-Effective Supervision & 
Additional Support 
 
- do - 
-Insp. Supvrn. & 
Monitoring Procedure 
 
-Support Procedure 
N 
 
 
Y 
MS, OM, AM, 
Mgr 
 
- do - 
IMPROPER STRATA CONTROL 
-Failure to identify bad 
roof 
 
-Improper Dressing 
-Improper Supervision 
 
-Poor workmanship 
-Non-superimposition of 
some pillars in 
contiguous working 
-Inadequate Support 
Design 
-Poor quality of support 
material 
-Effective Supervision 
 
-Proper dressing & Proper 
Supervision 
- Effective Supervision 
 
-Training, Test & Monitoring 
-Marking such pillars U/G & 
alert concerned people while 
extraction 
Review Support Design 
-Corrective Steps 
-Insp. Supvrn. & 
Monitoring Procedure 
-Dressing Procedure 
-Insp. Supvrn. & 
Monitoring Procedure 
-Training Procedure & 
Insp. Supvrn. & 
Monitoring Procedure 
-Survey Procedure 
-Procurement 
Procedure 
N 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
N 
N 
- MS, OM, AM, 
Mgr 
-do- 
-Mgr,SO,AM  
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TRAINING FACILITIES INADEQUATE 
-Non-existence of skilled 
trg.  Schedule 
-Untrained trainers 
-Infrastructure not to 
the requirement 
-Non-existence of 
Feedback / Test 
-Preparation of skilled trg.  
Schedule 
-Training for trainers 
-Group VTC to be equipped 
 
-To be started 
-Training Procedure 
 
- do - 
-do - 
 
-do - 
N 
 
N 
N 
 
N 
 
 
SHORTAGE OF SKILLED PERSON/DEPLOYMENT OF UNSKILLED PERSON  
-Absenteeism 
-Trg. not done as per 
requirement 
-Manpower Sanction  
not as per requirement 
-Examination for 
workmanship certificate 
not done regularly 
-Disciplinary action, Work 
Programme 
-Comply 
 
Agent to appraise Competent 
authority 
 
- do - 
Colliery Standing 
Order 
Y  
 
INADEQUATE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
-Non-availability of 
spare parts 
-Inadequate Capacity of 
Exchange 
 
-Agent to arrange 
-Agent to appraise competent 
authority 
-Procurement 
Procedure 
N Agent 
- do - 
POOR SUPERVISION 
-Negligence/ Lack of 
commitment 
-Not having proper 
knowledge / Experience 
-Inadequate training 
-Shortage of Supervisors 
 
-Monitoring, Motivation & 
Enforcement of discipline 
-Traing,& Feedback 
 
-do – 
-Transfer & Train to become 
competent 
 
-Inspection. 
Supervision & 
Monitoring Procedure 
-Training Procedure 
 
-do- 
-do- 
N 
 
N 
 
 
SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION 
-Panel extraction 
beyond incubation 
period 
-More coal left in goaf 
-Improper management 
of subsidence area 
-Poor construction / 
maintenance of seals 
-Plan to Extract panel within 
Incubation period 
-Extract judiciously 
-Crack filling/ Aforestation & 
Proper Monitoring 
-Construct & Maintain Seals 
as detailed in Sealing 
Procedure 
-Extraction Procedure 
 
-do- 
-Subsidence 
Management 
Procedure 
-Sealing Procedure 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
IMPROPER SURVEYING 
-Calibration of instt. not 
being done regularly 
-Non-superimposition of 
some pillars formed 
earlier 
-Surveying not done in 
time 
-Regular calibration 
-Mark such pillars at site & 
work accordingly 
-Regular Survey 
- 
-Extraction Procedure 
 
-Survey Procedure 
N 
 
N 
 
 
EXPLOSIVES / BLASTING 
-Not taking proper 
shelter especially with 
respect to contiguous 
-Monitor the efficacy of  
taking  shelter 
 
-Drilling & Blasting 
procedure 
 
N 
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working 
-Possibility of Blown 
through shots 
 
-Stop one of the approaching 
faces when within 9m. 
-Survey Procedure N 
HAULAGE 
-Poor quality of existing 
ropes & rollers 
-Safety devices not 
adequate 
-Procure ropes & rollers in 
advance & change old one 
timely. 
-Install monkey catches in 
Endless track & maintain all 
safety devices. 
-Machinery 
Installation & 
Maintenance 
Procedure 
-Conveying & Hauling 
Procedure 
N 
 
N 
 
 
MACHINERY 
-Maintenance schedule 
not followed 
-Temporary trailing 
cable joints 
-Bye-passing protective 
devices 
-Unskilled operators 
 
-Moving parts of 
machines 
-Implement, Monitor & / or 
take corrective action for non- 
compliance 
-Stop doing temporary joints 
-Stop machine if protective 
device is not functioning 
-Stop machine if skilled 
operator is not present-train 
more operators 
-Fence moving parts of 
machines &  Don’t allow 
people wearing loose dresses 
-Maintenance 
Schedule 
 
-Inspection. 
Supervision & 
Monitoring Procedure 
 
 
 
-Unsafe 
Practices/Unsafe Act 
& Colliery Standing 
Order 
Y 
 
N 
 
 
 
 
Y 
N 
 
 
LACK OF AWARENESS 
-Non-existence of 
documented procedures 
-Improper / inadequate 
training 
-Improper 
communication 
 
-Inadequate Publicity / 
Objective not explained 
-Document all Procedures &  
issue to  concerned persons 
-Traing,& Feedback 
-Detailed written 
communication either by 
letter or on Notice Board 
-Explain the objective 
- 
 
-Training Procedure 
 
 
 
N 
 
SEALED OFF PANELS 
-Improper management 
of subsidence area 
-Poor construction / 
maintenance of seals 
-Improper supervision 
-Improper sampling & 
analysis procedure 
--Blanketing / Crack filling & 
Proper Monitoring 
-Construct & maintain seals as 
detailed in Sealing Procedure 
-Regular supervision 
-Sampling & analysis as per 
Sampling Protocol 
-Subsidence 
Management 
Procedure 
-Sealing Procedure 
 
-Inspection. 
Supervision & 
Monitoring Procedure 
- Sampling Protocol 
  
INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS 
-Improper procurement 
planning 
 
-Delay in procurement 
action 
 
-Importance not given 
to the indents 
-Advance planning 
considering past requirement 
& growth 
 
-Avoid delay 
 
-Agent  to send reminders. 
 
-Material 
Procurement &  
Storage Procedure 
 
 
 
N 
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USE OF UNCALIBRATED INSTRUMENTS 
-Non-existence of 
calibration procedures 
 
-Non-existence of 
calibration 
infrastructure 
 
-Non availability of 
spare Instruments 
-Develop a system for 
periodic calibration, 
document, implement & 
monitor 
 
 
-Competent authority may be 
appraised & reminded for 
need & status. 
   
 
VENTILATION NOT TO PLAN 
-Delay in construction of 
stoppings 
 
-Tampering of 
ventilation       devices 
 
-Poor construction of 
stoppings 
-Competent authority may be 
appraised about the 
reluctance of contractor for 
doing jobs at lower rates and 
may be requested to solve the 
problem at the earliest. 
-Effective Inspection  & 
Supervision 
- 
 
 
 
 
-Sealing Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OTHER  FIRES 
-Conveyor  Fire 
 
-Electrical  Fires 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Fire during gas cutting 
 
 
 
-Spilled Off Lubricants 
-Clean Spilled coal/dust 
regularly & maintain drums & 
rollers properly 
-Maintain as per Schedule & 
Fire Extinguisher of Dry 
chemical Powder/CO2 /ABC 
type  near electrical 
appliances. Machines shall 
not be operated bye-passing 
protective devices or with 
temporary cable joints. Joint 
boxes shall be compounded. 
Use only approved type 
electrical appliances .  
-Site of gas cutting must be 
stone dusted well if 
combustible material is there 
& arrangement for water & 
Fire extinguisher must be kept 
ready. 
-Clean all spilled off 
oil/lubricants well to make 
the site intrinsically safe. 
-Conveying & Hauling 
Procedure 
-Maintenance 
Schedule 
-Fire Prevention 
Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Welding & Gas 
cutting Procedure 
N 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
 
EXTERNAL THREAT 
-Theft 
-Political issues 
-Ameliorate     
POOR ILLUMINATION 
-Non supply of spares 
-Tampering with light 
fittings 
-See control measures 
detailed in hazard named 
Inadequate Supply of Spare 
Parts 
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4.2 CRINUM MINE FIRE MANAGEMENT, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA 
The Fire Management Plan uses a strategy for eliminating uncontrolled fires by directing 
control over the elements which could lead to a fire.  Fundamentally, this will be managed by 
minimization of introduced combustibles and ignition sources.  Where fire occurs control will 
be exerted by means of breaking the fire triangle, requiring control or removal of the 
combustibles, heat or oxygen. 
The Fire Management Plan imposes strategies which are planned to eliminate all possible 
causes of fire in the mine.  In addition, the Fire Management Plan identifies the necessary 
contingencies should a fire occur. 
These strategies are: 
 Control of fuel  
 Control of ignition sources 
 Fire detection 
 Response to a small fire  
 Response to an escalating fire  
 Response to an out of control fire 
 Introduction of a system to control all sources of fuel before use. 
 
CONTROL OF FUEL 
A major source of combustible material is the coal seam itself.  In particular, coal dust is 
present in quantities sufficient to impose a fire hazard.  This hazard is controlled by 
prevention of spillage, removal of accumulations and rendering coal dust to an incombustible 
state by means of Stonedust. 
Procedures are in place to control standards of cleanliness in roadways including ‗Clean up of 
spillage‘.  All activities which use or encounter combustible materials shall be managed so 
that those materials cannot catch fire. 
Where combustible materials are encountered underground, removal to the surface and 
appropriate disposal will be conducted. 
All materials used underground or on the surface will be fire resistant where possible.  Where 
fire resistant materials cannot be used, steps shall be taken to render such materials safe.  For 
example, where polyurethane resin is used for the purposes of seal construction, a fire 
resistant coating will be applied to both sides of the seal in order to achieve this objective.  
Where new materials are introduced, the Fire Officer shall take steps to ensure that these 
standards are met. 
Inspection procedures are in place to ensure that the presence of combustible materials is 
minimised.  These include statutory inspections underground and specific fire inspections 
instigated by the Fire Officer.  The Fire Officer will delegate inspections with respect to 
compliance with the Fire Management Plan and will ensure that these inspections are 
conducted and action taken where non compliance is identified. 
CONTROL OF IGNITION SOURCES 
Equipment used at the mine is normally certified by an accredited testing authority and 
capacity to ignite fires is inherently controlled by this process.  For example, electrical 
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equipment used underground may be intrinsically safe (IS) or flameproof (FLP).  In 
particular, the following controls are in place which minimise the presence of a source of 
ignition in the mine environment in the form of Procedures or Work Instructions: 
 Construction and installation standards for all equipment 
 Routine inspection, test and maintenance of all equipment 
 System of tagging out defective equipment 
 Specialised repair for all explosion protected equipment 
 Procedure for cutting and welding 
 Spontaneous Combustion and Ventilation Management Plan 
 Control of contraband and search procedures 
 Procedures for vulcanising 
 Control of static electricity 
 
SKILLS 
A key control for fire prevention is the knowledge and commitment of all persons employed 
during their day to day activities. 
In order to maximise awareness and minimise the risk of fire at Crinum Mine, all persons 
employed in the mine shall have competency in the following: 
 Understanding and knowledge of the minimum standards of housekeeping required to 
minimise the presence of combustible materials in the mine 
 Knowledge of fire fighting equipment and procedures 
 Knowledge of evacuation procedures 
 There shall be a competent Fire Officer employed at the mine 
 A relief Fire Officer will be appointed to cover all duties of the Fire Officer in his 
absence from site for any extended periods. 
 
FIRE DETECTION 
The fire detection strategy will encompass the following aspects: 
 Continuous real time and tube bundle monitoring for carbon monoxide in the underground 
environment 
 Routine statutory and fire specific inspections 
 Surface fire alarms and testing 
 Temperature monitoring on key equipment if deemed necessary 
 Thermographic surveys. 
 
RESPONSE TO SMALL FIRES 
In the event of a small fire the following controls may be initiated to control and suppress the 
fire: 
 Fire extinguishers 
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 Fire fighting water reticulation system 
 Smothering/air exclusion 
 Removal of combustibles to a safe place 
 Removal of source of ignition 
 Evacuation of people affected by the fire and not involved in fire fighting 
 Immediate communication of incident to persons affected, supervisor and control 
room 
 Subsequent communication of incident to remainder of mine personnel. 
 Activation of vehicle fire suppression systems 
 
ESCALATING FIRES 
Where a fire cannot be controlled by the means described in the section above, some or all of 
the following additional controls may be implemented: 
 Increased use of the resources described in section 2.5 
 Communication of the state of the incident to the control room 
 Communication of the state of the incident to external emergency services 
 Implementation of emergency evacuation procedures 
 Implementation of ventilation fire controls 
 Implementation of ventilation smoke control 
 Activation of LTU water deluge system 
 Removal of electrical power 
 
LOSS OF CONTROL OF FIRE 
In the event that a fire is out of immediate control, mines rescue teams will be activated.  
INVESTIGATION  INTO ADDITIONAL CONTROLS 
Ongoing investigation may be instigated by the Fire Officer to identify methods of fire risk 
reduction.  These will include scheduled thermographic surveys and conveyor roller 
temperature monitoring and continual improvement to existing controls in place.  
Ventilation system 
The ventilation system has inherent controls relating to the control of fire hazards.  These 
include provision of multiple escape routes and segregation of conveyor roads from parallel 
intake airways in the interests of prevention of spreading products of combustion from a 
conveyor fire.    
The ventilation system can be used to control a fire or the results of a fire.  For example, 
products of combustion can be prevented from being spread by means of ventilation changes.   
The impact of fire on the ventilation system must be considered.  Where fire exists, damage 
to ventilation devices could exacerbate the effects of a fire by means of providing access by 
products of combustion to populated areas.  No ventilation system change would be permitted 
except with the express authority of the Incident Management Team. The impact of the 
ventilation system on fire and the means by which the risk of fire damaging ventilation 
 
65 
system components is controlled are covered by the Spontaneous Combustion and 
Ventilation Management Plan. 
4.2.1 Identified Key Hazards 
SCOPE STATEMENT 
The key hazards of fire at Crinum Mine were established by means of a risk assessment 
undertaken within the following scope: 
―Identify the key hazards that will result in fire at Crinum Mine and identify controls required 
to prevent and control such events.‖ 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
Stage 1 was a risk assessment based on a site audit of heat and smoke effects together with 
safety consequences within critical areas of the mine. 
The results of the audit were tabled to the Fire Management Plan design team who reviewed 
and updated the information in the light of recent knowledge. 
Results of the key risks analysis are shown on the following pages. 
Fig. 4.1: Underground Fire Analysis 
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Crinum Mine - Surface Fire Analysis
current recommended
controls controls
Initial Fire Description
Heat Effect:
Possible production ceased
Minor damage to equipment
Smoke Effect:
Smoke could contaminate 
underground airways
Safety Consequence:
Minor
Possible burns to personnel
Heat Source
Electricity
Vehicles
Bush fires
Cutting and 
welding
Smoking
Lightning
Coal braziers
Diesel heaters
Compressors
Escalating Fire Effect
Heat Effect:
Substantial damage to 
equipment.
Smoke Effect:
Further risk of contamination if 
underground airways
Safety Consequence:
Evacuation
Total Fire Effect
Heat Effect:
Loss of equipment
Loss of asset
Smoke Effect:
Contamination of underground 
mine
Safety Consequence:
Possible fatalities
Fuel
Loose coal/dust
Pallets
Chemicals
Gas bottles
Empty bags
Grease
Plastic
Oil 
Diesel
Furniture
Bulding fabric 
Vegetation
Coal stockpile
Fig 4.2: Surface Fire Analysis 
In stage 2 The risk assessment was used to identify hazards associated with fire in the 
underground and surface operations of the mine.  The findings of the risk assessment were 
not ranked as all issues were deemed equally damaging and of indeterminate probability.  
The risk assessment results were used by the assessment team to identify the necessary 
control measures that should be used in the Fire Management Plan.  The assessment team 
included the following personnel: 
 Safety Manager 
 Ventilation Officer 
 Fire Officer 
 Miner‘s Officer 
 Mineworker 
 External Expert (external review of plan details) 
 Level 5 Engineering Co-Ordinator 
Any future risk assessment and review will include a cross section of the workforce. 
The identified hazards are ranked in the prescribed manner, that is: 
In the event of any major changes in mine design as identified during the planning process, or 
as a consequence of a change in operations underground, the Fire Officer will initiate and 
complete a risk assessment to those changes.  The risk assessment will consider the hazards 
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involved in making that change with respect  to spontaneous combustion, ventilation and gas 
management. 
Table 4.5: PRINCIPLE IDENTIFIED HAZARDS AND CONTROL PROCEDURES 
The following tables indicate the hazards (having high probability and high consequence) 
identified during the development of the fire management controls.  For each hazard 
identified the control measures to reduce or eliminate that hazard are listed.  Control 
measures are listed in groups based on equipment, methods and skills to ensure that 
multifaceted implementation was considered 
 
CONTROL OF FUELS 
R
I
S
K 
FUEL DETAIL EXISTING CONTROLS RECOMMENDED 
CONTROLS 
1 Chemic
al 
Chemicals spill  CSIS procedures to be assessed 
for the fire implications 
1 Chemic
al 
Fire risk increased by 
incorrect chemical storage 
Segregated storage  
1 Chemic
al 
Heated chemicals increase 
quantity or toxicity of smoke 
and hinder evacuation 
process 
 Review emergency plan to 
ensure that risk is covered 
1 Coal Accumulations of loose coal Good house keeping 
Inspections 
 
1 Coal  Coal build up at conveyor 
drive, LTU and boot end 
Inspections 
Conveyor system design 
Routine weekly clean down 
 
1 Coal  Coal dust accumulations 
around conveyor transfer 
points 
Water sprays on transfer 
points 
Inspections 
Good housekeeping 
 
1 Coal  Coal spillage at transfer points Transfer chutes designed to 
eliminate spillage and chute 
blockages 
Inspections 
Good housekeeping 
 
1 Coal  Coal spillage from conveyors Good house keeping 
Conveyor design 
Inspections 
 
1 Coal  Coal stock pile  Water supply for surface fire 
mains to be made reliable 
1 Coal  Combustible dust 
accumulations on roadway 
floor 
Road maintenance procedure 
Inspections 
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CONTROL OF FUELS 
R
I
S
K 
FUEL DETAIL EXISTING CONTROLS RECOMMENDED 
CONTROLS 
 
1 Coal  Fine coal carried back over 
drive rollers 
Belt scrapers 
 
Mine to specify rubber surfaced 
belts to be replaced to reduce 
fines carry over 
1 Coal  Presence of coal dust in 
roadways 
Statutory inspections 
Stone dusting procedure to be 
carried out 
Procedure for roadway dust 
sampling 
 
1 Coal  Presence of combustible dust Procedure for stonedusting 
Inspections 
 
1 Coal Rib spall Procedures contained within 
the GMP 
 
1 Convey
or belt 
Conveyor belt fire Conveyor maintenance 
Deputies conveyor conditions 
inspections and reports 
carried out 6 times per 24 hr  
 
1 Convey
or belt 
Conveyor tracking badly 
leading to spillage 
Belt wander switches with 
alarm on drive units 
Deputies’ inspections 
 
1 Diesel Diesel bulk fuel leakage Installed to Australian 
Standard 
Bund wall 
Inspections 
 
1 Diesel Diesel bulk fuel spillage due to 
vehicle collision 
 Investigate collision protection 
1 Diesel Diesel vehicles spill fuel Vehicles comply with 
Australian Standard  
Vehicle design 
Maintenance and inspection 
 
1 Diesel Fuel bay leakage Good housekeeping 
Inspections 
Develop a standard for 
underground fuel bay 
construction and operation 
1 Fibregla
ss 
Fibreglass vent ducts fire FRAS materials 
Inspections 
 
1 Gas Methane or other gas present 
in underground workings 
Ventilation system 
SCVP 
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CONTROL OF FUELS 
R
I
S
K 
FUEL DETAIL EXISTING CONTROLS RECOMMENDED 
CONTROLS 
Role of Ventilation Officer 
Deputies inspections 
GMP 
1 Grease/
Oil 
Grease spilled from 
containers in transit 
 
Procedure for transport of 
palletised material 
Inspections 
 
1 Grease/
Oil 
Oil spilled from containers in 
transit 
Inspections Procedure for transport of 
palletised material 
1 Grease/
Oil 
Transformer oil spill Transformer design 
Inspections 
All transformers fitted with oil 
catchment trays 
Maintenance procedures 
Bunding of transportable sub 
stations 
 
1 Other Brattice cloth fire FRAS materials 
Inspections 
 
1 Other Drive belts / hoses are non 
FRAS 
 Develop a procedure that 
confirms vendor  compliance with 
FRAS requirement 
1 Other Flammable drive belts / hoses FRAS materials  
1 Paper Empty bags left underground House keeping  procedures 
Inspections 
 
1 Paper Tecrete bags left underground 
 
House keeping procedures 
Inspections 
 
1 Plastic Plastic wrapping left 
underground 
House keeping procedures 
Inspections 
 
1 Plastic Plastics and foam associated 
with use of Polyurethane 
Resin (PUR) 
 Contractor to provide procedure 
for the use of PUR 
1 Rubber Vent tube rubber fire FRAS materials  
1 Timber Furniture \ building  fire Good housekeeping Fire suppression to key areas 
Fire alarm system 
1 Timber Timber close to electrical 
equipment 
Inspections Training 
Procedure for installation of 
electrical equipment 
1 Timber Timber left underground House keeping procedures  
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CONTROL OF FUELS 
R
I
S
K 
FUEL DETAIL EXISTING CONTROLS RECOMMENDED 
CONTROLS 
Inspections 
1 Timber Timber used for secondary 
roof support 
 Investigate use of foam / tin can 
to replace timber supports 
1 Vegetati
on 
Surface vegetation fire 
 
House keeping procedures 
Inspections 
 
1 Vegetati
on 
Vegetation / timber on surface Program of grounds 
upkeeping 
Inspections 
 
 
Table 4.6: FIRE ACTION RESPONSE PLAN 
 Normal Sources  Detection of 
smoke or 
fire  
Confirmed 
fire 
Escalating 
fire 
Out of 
control 
Mine worker  Work to 
standard 
procedures 
& WI 
Rectify any 
potential 
hazard and 
report prior 
to EOS 
Investigate 
/fight as 
required 
report ASAP 
Continue to 
fight fire until 
unsafe 
Continue to 
fight fire until 
unsafe 
Evacuate 
Monitoring 
Room 
Coordinator 
Monitor U/G 
environment 
 Acknowledg
e alarm 
report 
Section 
Coordinator 
and Shift 
Coordinator 
record 
communicat
e initiate 
emergency 
response 
Declare 
emergency 
and activate 
emergency 
procedures 
Declare 
emergency 
and activate 
emergency 
procedures 
Declare 
emergency 
and activate 
emergency 
procedures 
Section 
Coordinator 
Inspection 
report record 
on statutory 
report 
Action to 
rectify any 
potential 
hazards 
Report when 
complete 
Investigate 
report  
initiate action 
as required 
initiate 
Emergency 
response 
Declare 
emergency 
and activate 
emergency 
procedures 
Declare 
emergency 
and activate 
emergency 
procedures 
Declare 
emergency 
and activate 
emergency 
procedures 
Shift 
Coordinator 
Inspect liaise 
with Section 
Coordinator 
plan work 
record 
 Ensure 
alarm was 
investigated 
Ensure 
action is 
initiated 
Declare 
emergency 
and activate 
emergency 
procedures 
Declare 
emergency 
and activate 
emergency 
procedures 
Declare 
emergency 
and activate 
emergency 
procedures 
Fire Officer Monthly 
inspection 
  Review and 
assess 
Report to the 
Underground 
Report to the 
Incident 
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audits actions Mine 
Manager 
Management 
Team 
Underground 
Mine 
Manager 
Ensure plan 
is complied 
with / 
reviewed 
and modified 
as 
appropriate 
  Form IMT 
and follow 
emergency 
procedures 
Form IMT 
and follow 
emergency 
procedures 
Form IMT 
and follow 
emergency 
procedures 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5.0 Computer Modelling 
 
Computer modeling in Risk Assessment is a relatively new process. Risk Assessment 
for mines is even scarce and rare to be found in application using computers. In todays 
world we have the availability of good software‘s and fast machines. It is possible to 
quantify and compile many of the nuances of Risk hazards in mines, the only problem 
being that no suitable methodology exists. Even in professional Disaster management 
institutes, Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plans for mine workings are not 
undertaken. We have studied and tried to use two software‘s available for drawing of 
Fault Tree and Event Tree. The software‘s were demonstration versions, hence we 
were not able to utilize all the features supplied.  
We have also constructed a programming model based on the Fire Risk Events 
leading to a Mine fire in the above mentioned case studies. We have dealt with 6 
major events which could result in a Mine Fire. 
 
 
Fig.5.1 : Fault Tree Using 
FaultTree+ 11.0 by Isograph 
Ltd. for Mine Fire Modelling 
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5.1 FAULTTREE+ 11.0 
 
FaultTree+ analysis program for Microsoft Windows enables us to analyse the availability 
and reliability of both complex and simple systems and is easy and intuitive to use. 
FaultTree+ provides an integrated environment for performing fault tree analysis, event tree 
analysis and Markov analysis. The program is rich in features and can model a wide range of 
scenarios.  
The FaultTree+ program is a powerful systems reliability analysis tool that allows fault and 
event tree analyses to be performed in an integrated environment.  Customized Markov 
models may also be linked to events in the fault or event tree diagram. The program may also 
be used to analyze fault trees, event trees and Markov models independently. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2: Event Tree for Mine Fire using FaultTree+ 11.0 
 
The program runs under Microsoft Windows and is capable of analysing large and complex 
fault and event trees producing the full minimal cut representation for fault tree TOP events 
and event tree consequences. 
FaultTree+ provides CCF analysis, importance analysis, uncertainty and sensitivity analyses 
facilities.  The program allows users to construct a single project database containing generic 
data and event tables, fault trees with multiple TOP events, event trees originating from 
different initiating events, CCF tables and consequence tables.  Fault and event tree 
pagination is automatically controlled by the program.  Fault tree TOP events may be used to 
represent specific columns in the event tree.  Multiple branches are also handled to allow for 
partial failures. Users may feed the end branches of event trees into secondary event trees 
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eliminating the need for the user to reproduce identical event tree structures leading to 
identical consequences. 
FaultTree+ uses efficient minimal cut set generation algorithms to analyse large and complex 
fault and event trees.  NOT logic may be included in the fault and event trees at any level and 
the event success states retained in the analysis results as an option. 
FaultTree+ provides a flexible import/export facility that allows the user to transfer data to 
and from Microsoft Access databases, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and text delimited and 
fixed length files. 
FaultTree+ has been used to perform systems reliability analysis by a wide range of different 
industries for over a decade.  
 
5.2 Logan Fault and Event Tree Analysis Version 6.03 
 
Fault Tree construction is used in a wide range of industries as an analytical tool for assessing 
the frequency and/or probability of failure of various systems.  Each unique way that system 
failure can occur is made up of failures of individual components or combinations of 
components.  These combinations of components can be represented by a logic network.  
Such a logic network is called a Fault Tree.   
Event Trees are also used in a wide variety of industries as an analytical tool for assessing the 
frequency of various outcomes resulting from various sequences of success or failure of a 
number of systems.  Event Trees can be regarded as decision Trees where a decision is either 
true of false.   
LOGAN is a program which facilitates the construction of both Fault and Event Trees, allows 
the two types of Tree to be linked and automates their quantification.   
LOGAN for Windows™ allows the construction and analysis of Fault and Event Trees in the 
Windows™ Graphical User Interface environment.  The option to edit Fault and Event Tree 
data files directly is not available in LOGAN for Windows
™
 but as an alternative the files can 
be created or edited using a text editor such as Notepad. 
The Fault Tree module of LOGAN can also be used to solve problems expressed in success 
logic such as Reliability Block Diagrams and Success Logic Diagrams.  
 
5.3 Programming model for Mine Fire  
We created two working programs for calculating the event possibility of a mine fire using 
Fault Tree and Event Tree analysis. The flowcharts for both the models have already been 
displayed in figures 19 & 20. The first program was created using C++ and FaultTree+ 11.0, 
latter being used to create the fault tree for the respective problem, and C++ to create the 
programming code. The program works on the simple input to a set of questions which are 
treated as basic events, and logic gates to compute the eventuality of a Mine Fire. 
Here is the code for the working program 
#include <iostream.h> 
#include <conio.h> 
using namespace std; 
int main() 
{ 
 int ce,iv,sc,fe,b,fm; 
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 int fgp, temp, is, mf; 
 cout<<"MAIN MENU:-\n"; 
 cout<<"1 for YES, 0 for NO\n"; 
 cout<<"Enter Continuous Emission Status:"; 
 cin>>ce; 
 cout<<"Enter Inadequate Ventilation Status:"; 
 cin>>iv; 
 cout<<"Enter Spontaneous Combustion Status:"; 
 cin>>sc; 
 cout<<"Enter Faulty Electrics Status:"; 
 cin>>fe; 
 cout<<"Enter Blasting Status:"; 
 cin>>b; 
 cout<<"Enter Faulty Machineries:"; 
 cin>>fm; 
 fgp=ce&&iv; 
 is=fe&&b&&fm; 
 if (fgp) 
 cout<<"Flammable Gas Present\n"; 
 else 
 cout<<"Flammable Gas Not Present\n"; 
 if (is) 
 cout<<"Ignition Source Present\n"; 
 else 
 cout<<"Ignition Source Not Present\n"; 
 temp=fgp||sc; 
 mf=temp&&is; 
 if (mf) 
 cout<<"Mine Fire Occurs\n"; 
 else 
 cout<<"Mine Fire Does Not Occur\n"; 
 cout<<"Thank You for Using The Analysis Software\n"; 
 getch(); 
} 
 
Output for this program: 
MAIN MENU:- 
1 for YES, 0 for NO 
Enter Continous Emission Status:1 
Enter Inadequate Ventilation Status:1 
Enter Spontaneous Combustion Status:1 
Enter Faulty Electrics Status:0 
Enter Blasting Status:1 
Enter Faulty Machineries:1 
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Flammable Gas Present 
Ignition Source Not Present 
Mine Fire Does Not Occur 
Thank You for Using The Analysis Software 
 
The second program was created for an Event Tree of the same Mine Fire model created by 
us. In this program, we can calculate the eventual possibility of any particular route, by a 
simple selection process of yes/no questions and probability value input for each branch of 
the Event Tree. Therefore, we were able to accurately ascertain the cumulative probability of 
the event of Mine Fire taking place by any sequence of events. 
Here is the code for the working program: 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <conio.h> 
main() 
{ 
int ch; 
float x,y,z; 
doan: 
system("cls"); 
printf("Input incident type,\n 1. Continious emmision of flammable gas.\n 2. Spontaneous 
Combustion\n"); 
scanf("%d",&ch); 
printf("Input probabilty of incident :"); 
scanf("%f",&x); 
printf("\nMine being worked at this time or not ? (1-yes/2-no) :"); 
scanf("%d",&ch); 
if (ch==2) { 
                    printf("Input probabilty of mine not being worked :"); 
                    scanf("%f",&y);  
     printf("\n\nNo injuries will occur,\nProbabilty of mine 
fire : %f",x*y); 
     printf("\n\nCalculate another (1-yes/2-no) :"); 
     scanf("%d",&ch); 
     if (ch==1) goto doan; else return 0; 
      
     } 
printf("Input probabilty of mine being worked :"); 
scanf("%f",&y); 
printf("\nIgnition source is present or not ? (1-yes/2-no) :"); 
scanf("%d",&ch); 
printf("Input probabilty :"); 
scanf("%f",&z); 
if (ch==1)  printf("\n\nAccident will occur, with severe injuries."); 
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else  printf("\n\nAccident will NOT occur"); 
 printf("\nProbabilty of mine fire : %f",x*y*z);          
printf("\n\nCalculate another (1-yes/2-no) :"); 
scanf("%d",&ch); 
if (ch==1) goto doan; else return 0; 
} 
 
Here is the output for the program: 
 
Input incident type, 
 1. Continious emmision of flammable gas. 
 2. Spontaneous Combustion 
1 
Input probabilty of incident :0.6 
Mine being worked at this time or not ? (1-yes/2-no) :2 
Input probabilty of mine not being worked :0.4 
No injuries will occur, 
Probabilty of mine fire : 0.240000 
Calculate another (1-yes/2-no) : 
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CHAPTER 6 
6.0 Recommendations & Conclusion 
 
6.1 Recommendations: 
 Risk management must be seen as a tool for development of appropriate health and 
safety management systems. 
 Every mining company should identify one or more mines and should undertake a 
formal   risk assessment process aimed at reducing the likelihood and impact of 
mishaps of all kinds in mines subsequently risk assessment process should be 
extended to other mines. 
 Risk assessment process should aim at effective management of risks, by identifying. 
o Which risks are most in need of reduction, and the options for achieving that 
risk reduction. 
o Which risks need careful on-going management, and the nature of the no-
going attention. 
 The risk assessment exercise should follow an appropriate process. 
 Risk management plans should be prepared on the basis of risk assessment and 
implemented in the identified mines. 
 Indian mines are not employing risk assessment techniques as the process of mining is 
under the control of a select organizations where money making is more important 
than safety measures. For such mines, risk assessment must be made mandatory. 
 
6.2 Conclusion: 
It was perceived during the study of the project that the present condition of ‗mine 
environment and safety risk‘ is at a low. It was found that mine risk assessment techniques 
and implementations are more popular in the developed nations like Australia, USA, Canada, 
European countries etc. and are yet to gain a definite and precise foothold in the Indian 
mining scenario. Some Indian mines are employing risk assessment techniques although 
much work has to be done in terms of successful application and identifiable results. 
In the visit to the Disaster Management Institute, we learnt that these institutes haven‘t 
undertaken mine risk assessment because of the difficulties faced in quantifying various risks 
associated with mining industry. These risks can be quantified, but require meticulous 
planning and implementations by the hands of skilled engineers. Computer modeling 
techniques are available and programs can be made to adequately suffice the absent advent of 
Risk Assessment Modeling in the Indian mining industry. Since we were low on resources 
and ability, we weren‘t able to quantify and plan for the various problems like Mine Fires, 
Inundation, Roof Fall etc., but we used the most basic factors for Mine Fire and made the 
programs. The programs can be easily increased in scope and measure with the addition of 
other important features. 
 It is also important to keep statistics and historical incidents in mind while designing these 
programs so as to ensure that ‗History Shouldn‘t Repeat Itself‘. 
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